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In recent years there has been increasing interest in the debate regarding the role of 
trauma and abuse in the development of distressing experiences labelled as 
'psychosis'. However, despite literature reporting a high prevalence of physical and 
sexual abuse in those diagnosed with psychosis, the aetiology of psychosis has 
been predominantly constructed as best understood through biomedical or disease 
models. Research suggests such models are most strongly endorsed by 
psychiatrists in relation to the categories of psychoses, in particular schizophrenia. 
These models tend to position life events as triggers of an underlying biogenetic 
vulnerability, and therefore have implications for psychiatric practices, the identity of 
those labelled as ‘psychotic’, and the meaning that is attributed to a person's 
experience of distress.  
This study adopted a critical realist social constructionist epistemology to explore 
psychiatrists' discursive constructions of the relationship between trauma and 
psychosis using qualitative methodology. Seven psychiatrists with experience 
working in NHS services were interviewed. Interviewees appeared to draw on 
psychiatric classification systems to define both 'psychosis' and 'trauma', therefore 
privileging individual and internal pathology, and limiting acknowledgement of 
contextual influences on a person's distress. A biomedical aetiological repertoire was 
consistently drawn upon which constructed psychosis as a brain disorder with 
psychosocial factors positioned as consequences, or symptoms, of an illness. This 
reliance upon medical pathological frameworks to define 'psychotic' experiences led 
to an incompatibility with a view of a person's distress as meaningful and 
understandable in the context of their lives. Psychiatry's professional alignment with 
medicine favoured impersonal, neutral and objective accounts of treatment 
decisions, with the construction of decontextualised individuals warranting 
interventions targeting the modification of internal biological pathology. Furthermore, 
constructions that positioned a person as a passive victim of internal pathology, 
diverted professional attention from how and why people were subjected to abuse 
and/or neglect. Implications of the study are considered in relations to research and 
theory, professionals practice and training, and service users. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Psychosis  
Psychosis is a term generally used in reference to psychiatric diagnoses which 
assume a person to have lost contact with reality. It is characterised by experiences 
of heightened sensitivity, unusual experiences (those that are not experienced by 
others, e.g. hallucinations and unusual beliefs), distress, despair, confusion and 
disorganization (Read et al., 2004). In psychiatric literature these kinds of 
experiences are often made sense of with the use of diagnostic categories, such as 
schizophrenia, which is the most common and considered most severe. However, 
several other psychiatric diagnoses are considered to be on a psychosis spectrum 
(Read et al., 2004; Geekie & Read, 2009). The current and most widely used 
operational definition of schizophrenia can be found in the American Psychiatric 
Association's (APA) Diagnostic and statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, DSM IV-R, 
and also the World Health Organisation's International Classification of Diseases, 
ICD-10 (APA, 2004; WHO, 2010). In recent years it has become increasingly 
common to use the term 'psychosis' in clinical settings, however it has been less 
clearly defined than that of schizophrenia (Geekie & Read, 2009; Boyle, 2006). 
Therefore, much of the research presented in this chapter will be in relation to 
schizophrenia.  
1.2. The Debate of Causality in Psychosis 
The distress and difficulties often labelled as 'mental illness' are understood in a 
variety of ways, both within psychiatric services and in society more broadly 
(Broome, 2007; Harland et al., 2009; Magliano et al., 2011). This is reflected in the 
enormous range of possible causal explanations of psychotic experiences that have 
been suggested (BPS, 2000). Despite enormous efforts, it is widely held that the 
causes of the experiences labelled as 'psychosis' and 'schizophrenia' are not well 
understood (NICE, 2010). However, there are a number of aetiological models that 
have been developed in order to understand the possible causes, these broadly 
consist of; medical or disease models, psychological models, and social models. 
Each model is defined by particular assumptions regarding the causes of mental 
distress which in turn have significant implications for; the focus and methods of 
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causal research; how the individuals suffering mental distress are viewed by 
professionals and wider society; the significance attributed to 'symptoms' (what they 
are and what they mean); how and what treatment interventions are provided; and 
the course and outcome of an individual’s distress (Bentall, 2003; Read et al., 2004; 
Davey, 2008; Harland et al., 2009). Consequently, models of aetiology have 
particular importance to the field of mental health and psychiatric professionals, none 
more so than psychiatrists. 
There has been a long history of acknowledging the role of life experiences in the 
causation of  distress in those who come to be described as 'mad' or 'mentally ill', 
this can be seen in ongoing debates which have taken place since the origins of 
modern psychiatry (Boyle, 2002a). Over recent years there has been a significant 
interest regarding the role of trauma, in particular physical and sexual abuse, in the 
distress experienced by those who have received diagnoses of psychosis or 
schizophrenia (Johnstone, 2011).  A key dialectic that is highlighted by this debate is 
whether,   
 'Madness is a meaningful and understandable response to life 
 circumstances? Or simply the manifestation of a biological based illness, 
 with life events operating, at most, as 'triggers' of a meaningless disease 
 process?' (Johnstone, 2011, p. 101).  
In the case of psychosis, certain experiences such as delusions and hallucinations 
are commonly seen through a biomedical model of psychiatry, as 'symptoms' of an 
underlying illness or brain disease (Johnstone, 2011; Boyle, 2002a). However, 
advocates of psychosocial models see such experiences as meaningful, although 
not necessarily always immediately understandable, in the context of the person's 
life (DCP, 2011). These often competing positions are based upon assumptions as 
to the nature of a person's distress and have over time come to be supported by 
varying types of evidence and complex theoretical networks (Boyle, 2002a; 2011). It 
is said that these assumptions can be organised according to several oppositions 
which are reflected in traditional theorizing including individual/social and 
normal/pathological (Harper, 1996). Despite this debate the understanding of the 
causes of distress or madness, and in particular psychosis, in mainstream 
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psychiatric practice are dominated by the individual and pathological poles (Harper, 
1996, 1999). For that reason, madness is currently seen as something to do with a 
person's health and therefore, requires professional 'expert' help sought from doctors 
and hospitals. This distress being commonly seen as something that is located within 
an individual's mind, rather than in relationships or the social context (Cromby et al., 
2013). 
The aim of this chapter will be to examine the systems of knowledge which have 
developed in relation to both the biomedical and psychosocial models of the distress 
labelled as psychosis. In particular how; when considering the role of trauma and 
abuse in the area of psychosis and schizophrenia - a diagnosis which has been 
referred to as 'the prototypical psychiatric disease' which theorizes according to a 
biomedical model as arising from individual internal pathology - questions are asked 
of a set of assumptions upon which modern psychiatry is built (Johnstone, 2011; 
Boyle, 2002a). Furthermore, by examining the views and attitudes held by 
psychiatric professionals, and in particular psychiatrists, there will be an exploration 
of the influence of these systems of knowledge on practices and the consequences 
for mental health institutions and individuals in distress (Georgaca, 2013; Harper, 
1996). 
1.3. The Construction of Psychosis 
Geekie & Read (2009) highlight that categories such as psychosis are ‘essentially 
contested constructs’, meaning there will probably never be universal agreement in 
how to define them, let alone what causes them (Geekie & Read, 2009, pp. 7). Much 
of the mainstream writing and research in this area is based upon positivist empiricist 
assumptions that an entity 'psychosis' exists whilst debating about 'its' nature 
(Harper, 1996). Whereas from a social constructionist perspective, such diagnostic 
categories are considered as one of a number of powerful discourses that construct 
'psychosis' and 'schizophrenia' as reflecting a particular reality. Boyle (2002a) 
defined these discourses as "patterns or regularities in the way we talk or write about 
particular phenomena, which have certain important effects" (p.207). These patterns 
are considered to establish or 'produce' and make seem reasonable a particular 
version of reality (Willig, 2001). In the following section there will be a consideration 
10 
 
of the main discourses that have constructed not only 'psychosis' and 'schizophrenia' 
as a reasonable version of reality, but also as a brain disease with a biogenetic 
cause (Boyle, 2002a). 
1.4. The Categorical Approach  
A powerful mechanism that maintains the belief of 'psychosis' and specifically 
schizophrenia as a brain disease is the consistent presentation of the category 
'schizophrenia' as a diagnosable illness that requires professional expertise to 
identify and modify (Boyle, 2002b). Boyle (2002a) has drawn attention to what 
Foucault (1976) calls the 'conditions of possibility', 'These being the conditions which 
made it seem reasonable for psychiatrists' to 'discover' a specific mental disease 
which explained a wide range of bizarre behaviours', namely dementia praecox later 
known as schizophrenia (Boyle, 2002a, p. 43). As well as the dominant construct of 
psychotic illnesses, as 'degenerative biological diseases', and as a result a focus 
predominantly on biological practices of intervention which require specialist 
expertise to deliver (Zipursky et al., 2012; Bendall et al., 2011; Bentall, 2003). 
It is suggested that by the 1900's, European psychiatry was a well-established 
medical speciality (Szasz, 1979). However, according to some writers, if physicians 
wanted to maintain a professional claim to their involvement in madness, it had 
become a practical necessity to accommodate it into whatever theoretical framework 
that was being utilised to study physical ailments (Bentall, 2003; Cromby et al., 
2013). According to Szasz (1979), the discovery of the syphilitic origin of paresis 
allowed the scientific confirmation of the somatogenic hypothesis first asserted by 
Griesinger in 1845 that; 'persons whose brains are abnormal are likely to exhibit 
behaviour commonly judged abnormal' (Szasz, 1979, p.6; Cromby et al., 2013). It is 
posited that this allowed the emergence of what we now come to think of as the role 
of psychiatry as being the diagnosis, study, and treatment of mental diseases, which 
as described by Szasz (1979) are the, "abnormal biological processes within the 
patient's head manifested by the psychological and social "symptoms" of his illness' 
(p.6). Such hypotheses were based upon Cartesian dualism that had become 
prevalent in Western psychiatry. This idea holds the mind as distinct from the brain 
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which is seen as a purely material and deterministic neurological mechanism (Scull, 
1979; Bracken et al., 2012). 
Following the development of the somatic hypothesis it began to dominate 
understandings of madness and informed Emil Kraeplin’s, Eugen Bleuler's and Kurt 
Schneider's construction of schizophrenia (Boyle, 2002a). The early conception of 
the term Schizophrenia was first suggested by Eugene Bleuler as a replacement for 
the idea of 'dementia praecox' originally proposed by Emile Kraeplin (Jablenski, 
2007). Based upon, at the time, reasonable assumptions that a similar disease 
process as studied in internal medicine might apply to people labelled as mad, 
Kraeplin developed the idea that there was a 'discrete and discoverable number of 
psychiatric disorders, and that each disorder will have its own typical symptom 
picture' (Bentall, 2003, p. 13).   
Subsequently the schizophrenia construct, as well as the categorical approach, have 
been developed and refined in Western psychiatry through the technology of 
psychiatric classification systems, in particular the DSM and ICD in their numerous 
incarnations (APA, 2004; WHO, 2010; Boyle, 2002a). Key to the modern DSM is the 
view that distressed individuals are acted upon by impersonal forces, usually 
biological dysfunction, and therefore their experiences are not meaningful or 
intelligible (Jacobs & Cohen, 2010; Boyle, 2011). Thus it is suggested that the 
reification of the diagnostic category 'schizophrenia' has had profound implications 
upon the search for causal explanations in that it is incompatible with the 
acknowledgment of a person's life story (Jacobsen & Cohen, 2010; Sarbin, 1991). 
Furthermore, it is claimed it has led to causal research, conducted within positivist 
empiricist research paradigm, to be based upon the assumption that those assigned 
to the 'schizophrenia' category have something in common which will be absent in 
individuals considered 'normal' (Bentall, 1993). As will be discussed in the next 
section, if in fact those assigned to the 'schizophrenia' category have no more in 
common than a label, then a search for something of aetiological significance is 





1.5. The Validity of 'Schizophrenia' 
During the 1990's, the concept of schizophrenia came under increasing scrutiny via 
the systematic establishment that such categories demonstrate poor reliability and 
validity1 (Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988; Read, 2004). A key argument pertaining 
to validity has centred on the assumption that 'psychosis falls into discrete categories 
such as schizophrenia' (Bentall, 1993, p. 227). By applying the concept of 
'schizophrenia' to capture a wide range of behaviours and experiences, a problem 
arises in that rarely all are identifiable when observing an individual (Read, 2004). 
Read (2004) points out that to receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia using the DSM-
IV revised version, recently replaced by the DSM-V (APA 2000; 2013), a person 
needs to be assessed as meeting two of five 'characteristic symptoms'. This allows 
for 15 ways by which two people can meet the diagnostic criteria without sharing a 
common 'characteristic symptom'. This has led critics to suggest it is a disjunctive 
category and therefore 'scientifically meaningless', as Bentall (1993) states, this has 
obvious implications for aetiological research relying upon it to group individuals 
according to common characteristics (Read, 2004) 
Also of significance to aetiological claims, Boyle (2002a) highlights a key problem for 
'schizophrenia', being how 'behaviours and experiences have been interpreted as 
symptoms or signs of schizophrenia according to no clear set of rules or procedures', 
and furthermore, how the use of the term 'sign' has been used in a way that is 
significantly different from its use in medicine (p. 211). This is important given a key 
feature of a 'sign' in medicine is that it refers to a level of phenomena which can be 
independently observed by others (e.g. a measure of blood sugar), however, it is 
claimed that no such 'sign' exists for 'schizophrenia' (Cape et al., 1994; Boyle; 
2002a). In fact, in the case of schizophrenia, it is often used interchangeably with the 
term 'symptom', which refers to subjective complaints, to give a sense of such 
attributes being objectively assessed (Boyle, 2002a). Goffman (1961) has cautioned 
that psychiatry has relied overly on symptoms rather than 'signs', which raises 
questions as to their 'expert' understanding in this field. 
                                                          
1
 Systematic reviews have been produced by a number of authors including; Boyle (2002a) and Bentall (2003). 
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Therefore following the pragmatic development of the schizophrenia category, the 
possible heterogeneity of those considered to fall within the schizophrenia category, 
as well as the absence of pathognomic signs; has led to widely held concerns that 
much of the research based upon an assumptions of commonality between people 
with the schizophrenia diagnosis, is significantly flawed (Cape et al., 1994; Bentall, 
1993). However, the influences of the biomedical model assumptions of 
schizophrenia aetiology have had significant effects upon research and subsequently 
clinical practice (Boyle, 2011). 
1.6. The Influence of Biomedical Assumptions on Aetiological Research 
As illustrated, the drive to classify and group madness has led to the construction of 
what some believe to be a scientifically meaningless category, 'schizophrenia'; and 
to the assumptions its causes will be best understood through biomedical or disease 
models of aetiology (Read et al., 2004). Szasz (1960) suggests that 'this position 
implies that people cannot have troubles – expressed in what are now called “mental 
illnesses” - because of difference in personal needs, opinions, social aspirations, 
values, and so on'. In fact that all 'mental illnesses' are attributed to physicochemical 
processes which will be discovered by medical research, that 'mental illnesses' are  
basically regarded as no different than all other diseases (p.113). Therefore, this 
model allows the re-designation of social problems to medical ones, with an inherent 
assumption that the distressed person will require help from a suitably qualified 
professional in order to manage their distress (Moncrieff, 2011). It is claimed that the 
institution most invested in such a category is psychiatry, as it provides legitimation 
for its approaches to treatment, as well as preserving its status as a medical 
profession (Boyle, 2002a; Pilgrim, 2002, 2007; Moncrieff, 2011).  
Over the past century, the biomedical versions of psychosis and schizophrenia, and 
madness in general, have significantly influenced the direction of research, practice 
and public views (Kingdon & Young, 2007). However, despite attempts to determine 
the causal role of biology, the evidence does not point to any single cause (NICE, 
2010). In fact, Bentall (1993, 2003) highlights that there have been attempts to link 
schizophrenia with virtually every brain region or neurotransmitter via every advance 
in brain imaging. Yet the genetic,  neurophysiological and neurochemical 
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abnormalities that have been found to be associated with the diagnosis of 
'schizophrenia' are 'so diverse and  so nonspecific that they provide further evidence 
against the existence of a single, discrete 'schizophrenia disease entity', with some 
researchers suggesting there is sufficient evidence to reject the Kraepelian paradigm 
(pp. 229) (Craddock & Owens, 2005). 
Despite this, Boyle (2002a) proposes that it is not surprising credibility of the 
biomedical assumptions of schizophrenia have been sustained so widely given the 
variety of 'scientific' and 'medical' discourses which contribute to this version of 
reality (Burr, 1995). It is stated that a particularly significant discourse has been 
through the use of an empiricist repertoire, which has systematically offered a variety 
of 'objectively' supported hypotheses about brain biochemistry and pathology, and 
discoveries of genes that predict susceptibility. As well as leading to the generation 
of vast amounts of data to support these hypotheses (Boyle, 2002b; Kirk and 
Kutchins, 1992; Broome et al., 2005; Kety et al., 1994; Craddock et al., 2005; 
Seeman & Kapur, 2001; Shenton et al., 2001;Rujescu & Collier, 2009; Bentall, 2003; 
BPS, 2000; Nurnberger & Gershan, 1992, Weinberger, 2005; Sullivan & Kendlar, 
2003; Sullivan et al.,2000). Boyle (2002a) also draws attention to the continual 
evocation of a narrative of scientific progress, through which an impression of 
gradually moving toward the discovery of the purported biogenetic vulnerability is 
always around the corner but currently out of reach. Such a discourse is highlighted 
by Kety's (1974) famous remark 'if schizophrenia is a myth it is a myth with a strong 
genetic component' (p. 691). However, a number of critics suggest that it is widely 
acknowledged that there is no direct evidence to support any such claims2 (Bentall, 
2003). 
So despite lacking consistent empirical support, the biomedical model continues to 
support an extensive scientific network which makes apparently reasonable claims 
as to the biological basis of 'schizophrenia'. In fact, it is levelled that the reification of 
this biomedical approach has led to junior psychiatrists and trainee psychologists to 
adopt a biomedical model by assumptions of its truth (Kemker & Khadavi, 1995; 
                                                          
2
 Systematic reviews can be found elsewhere, e.g. Boyle, 2002a; Read et al., (2004). 
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Harper, 2013). However, as will be explored in the following sections, support for this 
model is far from monolithic (Harper, 2013). 
1.7. The Role of 'Trauma' in People's Experiences of Psychosis 
The previous sections have explored how assumptions of a medical model which 
underlie the DSM and much of psychiatric practice, view the experiences 
categorised as psychosis and schizophrenia as meaningless manifestations of 
internal pathology and have implications for aetiological research (Boyle, 2002a; 
Johnstone, 2011). Despite lacking empirical support it is suggested the reductionist 
‘biogenetic’ paradigm, has prevailed in mental health services and research, and it is 
widely espoused that it has prevented advances in understanding of psychosocial 
causes of mental health problems (Pilgrim, 2002; Johnstone, 2011; Boyle, 2011, 
2002; Read, 2004). However, this model has not existed unchallenged. In fact there 
has been significant advocation that both the form and the content of the 
experiences that are labelled psychosis and schizophrenia are 'systematically, 
meaningfully and inseparably related to social context and life experience' (Boyle, 
2011, pp 35). Such a challenge to the idea of that schizophrenia as a primary 
biological disease, should not be considered a parallel challenge to the reality that 
people can engage in behaviours that others might find to be bizarre, crazy, insane 
or irrational (Sarbin, 1991; Read et al., 2009).  
As with the biomedical model, there has been a rich theoretical and discursive 
network develop around this position (Read et al., 2004). For several decades there 
has been much controversy and inconsistency surrounding this area, in particular 
regarding the responsibility of parents for the madness of their children (Coulter & 
Rapley, 2011). In the late nineteenth century, Freud's 'seduction hypothesis', later 
revised to the 'oedipus hypothesis', claimed reports of sexual experiences were 
manifestations of fantasies created by children, as opposed to actual experiences 
(Strachey, 1962; Geekie & Read, 2009). Such an influential theory is said to, 
contributing to an assumptions that abuse disclosures by 'psychotic' patients  often 
represent 'content' of delusions, and should not to be engaged with (Bentall, 2003). 
During the 1960's and 70's however, R.D Laing, amongst others, wrote extensively 
with a focus upon the families of those labelled as schizophrenic. He hypothesized 
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that the unwanted and socially unacceptable conduct labelled as 'schizophrenia' was 
an understandable response to family conflict, and therefore socially intelligible 
(Laing 1960, 1669; Bentall 2003; Coulter & Rapley, 2011, p.161). This represented a 
shift to viewing 'pathology' labelled as 'schizophrenia' as residing in the relationships 
between family members, as opposed to object relations theorists view as residing in 
intrapsychic pathology (Laing 1960, 1969; Lidz & Lidz, 1949; Coulter & Rapley, 
2011). This view therefore advocated interventions that were focused upon social 
context. However, the potential impact of these theories was limited by a discourse 
of family blaming which led to avoidance of suggesting any causal roles of families 
(Johnstone, 1993). Terkelson (1983) has claimed this avoidance resulted in many 
family theorists failing to address aetiology completely, and therefore sacrificing 
conceptual clarity.  
In recent years controversy around this debate has re-emerged, but in the form of 
whether trauma and abuse play a role in the development of 'psychosis' (Read et al., 
2004; Johnstone, 2011). The controversy regarding this debate has been further 
amplified by the link with child sexual and physical abuse. 
1.7.1. Summary of recent findings 
Put simply, there is increasing evidence that the experiences of people labelled with 
psychosis can be a reaction to traumatic experiences (Johnstone, 2011). Much of 
this recent evidence has focused upon people categorised under the label 
'psychosis', with the assumption that this allows greater explanation of individual 
experiences and therefore, a focus upon meaning (Read et al., 2004, 2005). 
However, as with the term 'schizophrenia', there is growing concern regarding the 
uncritical use and reification of the term 'psychosis', due to its increasing use as 
alternative to 'schizophrenia' (Boyle, 2006; Johnstone, 2011). Particularly due to the 
risk it simply assimilates and perpetuates the problems of the 'schizophrenia' 
concepts including the 'privileging of biological over psychological and social 
theories' (Boyle, 2006, p.2).  
Notwithstanding these concerns, a large body of research has accumulated leading 
to the increasingly widespread acknowledgement of a relationship between early 
adversity and psychological difficulties of all types in later life (Shafer & Fisher, 
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2011). Central to these developing ideas has been research focused upon, what are 
considered traumatic experiences in childhood and adolescence, including sexual 
and physical abuse, and emotional abuse and neglect (Larkin & Read 2008; Read et 
al., 2009, Read, et al., 2008, Harrop & Trower, 2003). This research has revealed 
the prevalence of history's of physical and sexual abuse in people who have 
received a diagnosis of psychosis, as well as links to the form and content of the 
person’s psychotic experiences (Bendall et al., 2008; Read et al., 2005). Abuse is 
considered  a very common problem with estimates that in the general population 
around 11% of children are sexually abused (CSA) and 24% of children physically 
abused (CPA) (May-Chahal and Cawson, 2005). In comparison, in a review of 46 
studies, totalling 2604 female inpatients and outpatients, most of whom were 
diagnosed with psychosis, it was found that the majority of female patients (69%) 
report either CSA (48%) or CPA (48%), with 59% of male patients reporting suffering 
either CSA (28%) or CPA (50%), suggesting significantly higher rates in psychiatric 
populations (Read et al., 2005). These findings are supported by findings from a 
large sample of patients from the AESOP study, which reported finding that females 
diagnosed with first episode psychosis (FEP) where twice as likely than female 
controls to have experienced child physical or sexual abuse (Fisher et al., 2009). 
However, these findings have often been criticised for their reliance upon self-report 
methodology and therefore concerns as to the reliability of reports given by patients 
(Johnstone, 2011). 
The recent growing interest in this area is illustrated by the completion of several 
large-scale general population studies, a review in 2009 identified 11 in total (Read 
et al., 2009). One such study of a cohort of 2759 individuals taken from all notified 
cases of sexual abuse over a 30-year period in Victoria, Australia - therefore not 
relying upon self-report (Cutajar et al. 2010; Bendall et al, 2011). They were then 
matched with the Victorian Psychiatric Case Register (VCPR) for any psychotic 
disorder they received as adults. The findings indicated significantly increased odds 
of being diagnosed with psychosis (Odds ratio = 2.1) and schizophrenia (2.6) if they 
had histories of experiencing CSA compared with age and gender matched controls. 
Additionally observed was an association with the severity of abuse, such as more 
than one perpetrator, and increasing risk of developing psychotic syndromes 
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(Cutajar et al., 2010). Similar, 'dose response relationships' were identified in a 
prospective study carried out in the Netherlands, with 'mild abuse' having an odds 
ratio of 2.0, but 'severe abuse' being 48.4 (Read et al., 2009; Shafer & Fisher, 2011; 
Janssen et al., 2004). Furthermore, both anecdotal reports and research finding 
have highlighted a link between the content of 'psychotic' experiences and the actual 
experiences of childhood abuse (Johnstone, 2011, Herman, 1992; Larkin et al., 
2003).  
1.7.2. Critique of the 'trauma' discourse 
As suggested before, these finding challenge key assumptions upon which the 
biomedical model is built and therefore modern psychiatric practice. However, whilst 
this trauma focused research may have brought psychosocial causes back to 
mainstream attention, there is concern that it too is resulting in a subtle 'de-emphasis 
of the importance of the environment' (Boyle, 2006). Given that the construct of 
psychological trauma is now embedded within Western culture there is concern it 
obscures the complexity of peoples’ experiences (Boyle, 2006; Johnstone, 2011). 
Furthermore, its refinement through the technology of psychiatric classification 
systems in relation to the increasingly diagnosed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; in 
which an 'objective' scientific conceptualisation of the world is privileged; and in 
which a dualistic concept of a person is dominant (Bracken, et al., 1995; 
Summerfield, 1995, 2001; Pupavac, 2001). This leads to an individualistic and 
pathological framework for understanding experiences being evoked, and therefore 
labelling the individual as 'damaged' thus taking attention away from the abusers, 
and the societal and cultural systems that sustain these abuses (Patel, 2011; Jacobs 
& Cohen, 2010; Johnstone, 2011).  
Furthermore, there is significant concern that there are various discursive repertoires 
which have resulted in mental health professionals, in particular Clinical psychology 
and Psychiatry, avoiding confronting such causes of distress. It is posed that 
acknowledging context is not intentionally avoided but is result of assumptions 
embedded in mainstream psychology and psychiatry theory, research, language and 
practice (Boyle, 2011). These being those advocated by a biomedical model which 
views individuals in a decontextualised fashion, 'whose behaviours, cognitions and 
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emotions are best accounted for by reference to their brain and minds' (Boyle, 2011, 
p.34). As a consequence the significance of findings implicating non-biological 
causal factors are often downplayed through several rhetorical devices (Boyle, 
2002b). First, of which being the findings are correlational and therefore provide no 
evidence of a causal relationship (Johnstone, 2011). Second, for not providing 
evidence of 'mechanisms' that may help to understand how trauma may lead to 
psychosis (Boyle, 2011; Johnstone, 2011). Although there have been, several 
speculative psychological models developed in an attempt to explain the relationship 
between traumatic experience and the development of a psychotic experience 
(Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001; Bentall et al., 2001). These have been 
dominated by cognitive theories, which have been criticised for attributing distress as 
arising from biases, deficits or defects in the processing of information and stimuli 
(Cromby et al, 2013).  Boyle (2011) draws attention to how such models, strongly 
advocated by mainstream Clinical Psychology, have contributed to the obscuring of 
the role of life experiences in distress by focusing upon intrapsychic attributes, 
usually psychological deficits or abnormalities, to explain experiences associated 
with psychosis. These models therefore provide a rationale for focusing research 
and interventions upon an individual as opposed to upon their lives or context. 
Finally, and of particular importance due to its widespread advocation within mental 
health services; is the claim that the bio-psycho-social model or more specifically 
one of its most commonly referred to derivates - the 'stress-vulnerability model' - is in 
fact an illusion of balance and integration of models (Engel, 1980; Zubin, 1977; Read 
et al., 2004; Pilgrim, 2002). This model has become popular given its 
acknowledgment of the role of social stressors as triggers of a vulnerability, a 
vulnerability which over time has become synonymous with the notion of an 
underlying biogenetic vulnerability (Read, 2005; Coulter & Rapley, 2011). However, 
the original stress vulnerability model stated that vulnerability can be acquired and 
that this can be ‘due to the influence of trauma, specific disease, perinatal 
complications, family experiences, adolescent peer interactions, and other life events 
that either enhance or inhibit the development of subsequent disorders' (Zubin & 
Spring, 1977; p.109). By relegating the role of contextual factors to 'triggers' of an 
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existing vulnerability, the primacy of biology is maintained with aversive 
environments being downplayed (Read, 2004; Boyle, 2002, 2011).  
In spite of these concerns it is clear research, focused upon the lives of those 
experiencing distress labelled as 'psychosis', has provided a challenge to the 
traditional biomedical model, and stimulated much debate in psychology and 
psychiatry. It has raised questions regarding; the logical status of mental illness; the 
intelligibility of madness; and the role of institutional care delivered under a 
dehumanising biomedical regime (Pilgrim, 2002). Consequently, psychiatric 
professionals exist in an arena where the aetiological ideas that inform their 
professional practice are currently contested and are far from monolithic (Harper, 
2013). The following sections explore how this debate has influenced the aetiological 
models held and drawn upon in modern psychiatric practices, and whether the 
taken-for-granted ways of speaking, theorizing and practicing associated with 
mainstream psychiatry are identifiable (Boyle, 2011). 
1.8. The 'Attitudes' of Psychiatric Professionals 
Scull (1975) proposes that experts, through their power to legally label have the 
effect of focusing, defining and institutionalising a deviant's status, and differ from the 
layman in their authority to define the existence of a problem and how it should be 
managed (Foucault, 1976). Possibly the most important of these in the field of 
mental health are psychiatrists, who are strongly associated with providing scientific 
basis for their view of madness. As explored, it appears that there is a complex 
relationship between the various aetiological versions of psychosis and 
schizophrenia; each of which are maintained by a complex discursive network 
(Harper, 1996). Therefore there is a diversity of available perspectives for psychiatric 
professionals to negotiate in modern practice. There have been a number studies 
exploring how practicing psychiatrists construct 'psychosis' with a particular focus on 
'schizophrenia',  and the influence these constructions have upon their practice and 
the well-being of patients presenting with psychotic experiences (appendix 1 for 
search terms). 
A questionnaire study to ascertain the beliefs about schizophrenia aetiology and 
prognosis of 119 members and fellows of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
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employed by the South West Regional Health Authority, was conducted by Cape et 
al. (1994). Among the findings was an indication of ‘general clinical impression’ being  
heavily relied upon by practising clinicians during diagnosis, with Schneiderian first 
rank symptoms endorsed as most useful when testing this, 'clinical judgement' (Cape 
et al., 1994). This was opposed to the use of ‘tight’ operational diagnostic criteria 
such as that provided by the DSM-III (APA, 1980).  Also found was how organic 
aetiological models of schizophrenia including brain pathology, genetic 
predisposition, and neurotransmitter dysfunction, were most strongly endorsed. 
Cape et al. (1994) attributed these finding to biases in research literature towards 
finding biological causes of schizophrenia, as well as psychiatrists' training being 
largely based upon a biomedical model.  
Cape et al. (1994) indicated biological aetiologies were strongly associated with 
decision to treat with medication, whereas psychiatrists with strong beliefs of 
psychosocial causes were more likely to opt for non-medical treatments e.g. 
psychotherapy. It was posed that it is significant that schizophrenia has no external 
or objective criteria against which it can be validated, given that it appears the 
diagnostic process relies strongly upon the clinical impression of the professional, 
therefore leaving its definition and understanding subject to the prevailing political 
and social climate (Cape, et al., 1994). Similar findings were seen in a questionnaire 
study of 79 medical students finding they generally considered both psychological 
and biological factors when considering aetiology and treatment, but in the case of 
schizophrenia strongly endorsed a biological aetiology (Brog & Guskin, 1998).  
Recent research indicates a possible shift in aetiological attitudes held. Kingdon et 
al. (2004) surveyed members of the Royal College of Psychiatrists with a 
questionnaire comprising of two existing attitudes to mental illness survey 
instruments, supplemented with questions about schizophrenia and its management. 
Of 2813 (45% total contacted) respondents, 53.5% believed causes of schizophrenia 
were a balance of both social and biological factors, compared with 46.1% stating 
primarily biological causal factors.  
However, in contrast, the primacy of a biomedical model aetiological understanding 
of schizophrenia was demonstrated by Harland et al. (2009). A sample of psychiatric 
22 
 
trainees from South London and Maudsley NHS completed a questionnaire to 
measure the use various aetiological models such as, behavioural, biological, social 
constructionist etc., drawn upon to understand clinical material. The results 
suggested that particular models were linked to specific disorders, ‘to the extent that 
some disorders may be regarded by trainees as paradigmatic exemplars of the 
explanatory power of a given model’ (Harland et al., 2009, p. 973). Given among the 
examples was that 'schizophrenia has a biological aetiology and should be 
investigated through biological research', whereas generalised anxiety disorder 
should be seen from a cognitive behavioural perspective and treated through 
challenging and restructuring 'maladaptive thoughts' (Harland et al., 2009, p. 974).  
This possibly demonstrates that aetiological assumptions are not consistent across 
psychiatric diagnoses and therefore that varying causal factors are acknowledged. 
Additionally, the models that psychiatrists hold have an influence upon not only 
treatment but also the direction of further research.  
Magliano et al. (2011) used a self-report tool to assess the views of schizophrenia 
held by 5th and 6th year medical students at the University of Naples. In line with the 
previous findings the medical students strongly endorsing heredity as causal in 
schizophrenia. However, interestingly they found that 69% of students also endorsed 
stress and 45% of students endorsed psychological trauma, as causes of 
schizophrenia. It was suggested this represented the application of a distorted 
vulnerability-stress model by medical professionals. Thus allowing the 
acknowledgment of psychosocial trauma and stress in the aetiology of those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, whilst simultaneously maintaining the primacy of a 
biogenetic understanding (Magliano et al., 2011).  
These studies showed varying influence of age, experience and academic 
experience of the psychiatric professionals assessed. Cape et al. (1994) found a 
correlation between older, more experienced psychiatrists giving greater emphasis to 
the psychological aetiological factors, possibly suggesting  that the training of the 
older psychiatrists took place when psychological factors were more popular, 
alternatively that their experience has influenced their understanding. Whereas, 
Kingdon et al. (2004), indicated consultants favoured primarily biological causation 
when compared with trainees, and those qualified 10 – 20 years also marginally 
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favoured primarily biological aetiology (49.9% compared with 49.8%). However in 
general, the sample appeared to favour a balance between social and biological 
causes. It is possible these findings are a reflection of the continuing debate that is 
taking place with the psychiatric profession regarding the contested nature of 
aetiology, as well as illustrating institutional training biases, combined with the 
increasing availability of alternative theoretical models (Kingdon et al., 2004). 
Also demonstrated by several studies was the relationship between aetiological 
explanations of schizophrenia and the construction of people labelled as 
'schizophrenic'. It was indicated that viewing causality as biogenetic led to patients 
behaviour being positioned as unintentional and uncontrollable, for which they were 
less blame when compared with diagnoses considered as resulting from 
psychosocial causation, such as personality disorder (Magliano et al., 2011). 
However, simultaneously biogenetic causation led to an increasing stigmatization 
with the patient being seen as unpredictable, dangerous and chronically ill. Whereas, 
when the aetiology of schizophrenia is constructed as an individual's reaction to 
problematic life events and circumstances, recovery is seen as possible through 
improving environmental factors (Magliano et al., 2011; Miresco & Kirmayer, 2006; 
Mukherjee et al., 2002). These finding possibly represent the persistence of the 
mind-brain dualism in professional mental health, highlighting that medicine has 
become accustomed to thinking about human distress, and responsibility and 
intentionality in dualistic terms, often at the expense of acknowledging culture and 
context (Miresco & Kirmayer, 2006; Thomas & Bracken, 2011). 
1.9. The Influence upon the Public 
It has been demonstrated that the models of aetiology which are drawn upon to 
'educate' the public, have permeated contemporary culture, and are linked to the 
way people speak about their experiences, as well as how those suffering from 
mental health problems are viewed (Georgaca, 2013). There has long been an 
assumption that adopting a 'mental illness is just like any other illness' position, 
would encourage the general public to transfer their non-stigmatizing attitudes of 
somatic illness to that of mental illness (Sarbin & Mancuso, 1970). However, 
attempts to equate 'mental illness' with other medical disorders through biological 
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explanations have been shown to reduce blame, but provoke harsher behaviour 
toward a person with mental illness (Mehta & Farina, 1997). Additionally, findings of 
a study conducted in Germany which interviewed samples of the general public at 
two time points, 1990 and 2001, showed increased endorsement of biological 
attributions to aetiology over this period paralleled increased public rejection of 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia (Lopez-Ibor, 2002).  An explanation is that this 
'harsher behaviour' may be the result of individuals with 'mental illness' being viewed 
as physically distinct - 'almost a different species' (Corrigan & Watson, 2004). In 
addition, biological aetiological arguments may strengthen dangerousness 
stereotypes, suggesting they are unpredictable and violent (Read & Law, 1999). In 
contrast, the use of psychosocial explanations that acknowledge environmental 
stressors and trauma, have been shown to improve the image of people suffering 
from 'mental illness' and reduce the fear of the individuals (Morrison & Teta, 1980; 
Read & Law, 1999). 
Therefore, it can be seen that, far from being a monolithic view about schizophrenia, 
there appears to be diversity in the views of psychiatrists regarding causation and 
treatment (Harper, 1999). It is clear that the attitudes held by professionals can 
greatly influence the well-being of people receiving the label of psychosis with the 
research indicating influences on diagnosis, treatment approaches, and attributions 
regarding intentionality and responsibility of behaviour (Tiffin et al., 2009; Cape et al., 
1994, Patel, 2003; Patel, 2004). It too can be seen that the aetiological model held, 
particularly by professionals, have a significant impact upon how people who receive 
a diagnosis of psychosis are treated, managed and viewed by the public and 
professionals. Where it appears understanding based upon biomedical assumptions 
appear to have remained dominant. 
1.10. Critique of Research 
So far, as seen above, studies that focused upon investigating the 'attitudes' and 
'views' of psychiatrists, have relied upon a mainstream positivist epistemological 
position to research and the closely aligned assumptions of cognitivism (Willig, 
2001). Several of these assumptions have come under significant scrutiny from a 
social constructionist epistemological perspective (Edward & Potter, 1992).  
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Stevens and Harper (2007) suggest there are ‘fundamental epistemological 
difficulties with the notion that responses to lists of statement are unproblematically 
transformed into inferred mental constructs like beliefs or attitudes' (p.6). However, it 
is assumed that questionnaires or vignettes objectively access either; 'attitudes', that 
is how the psychiatrists feel about objects (schizophrenia) and events (diagnosis) in 
the social world; or the 'attributions' that have been made by psychiatrist such as 
how they account for their diagnostic actions. Fundamental to this is the assumption 
that the object, in this case 'mental disorders' and in particular 'schizophrenia', is 
itself consensual - that is that these objects are not disputed (Willig, 2008). 
Therefore, 'people agree on what it is they are talking about, but they disagree about 
why it happened (attributions) and whether or not it is a good thing (attitudes)' (Willig, 
2008, p. 94). However, this view is challenged by social constructionists who argue 
that these are in fact themselves aspects of the discursive construction of the object 
itself. Therefore, it is not participants’ attitudes and attributions toward 'schizophrenia' 
(social object) or the diagnostic process or aetiological formulation (social event) that 
differentiates them from each other. Rather it is the way in which they construct the 
object or event itself, primarily through language (Willig, 2008). This critique is 
particular pertinent when considering the constructs of 'psychosis' and 
schizophrenia', which as has been demonstrated are widely contested. 
Willig (2008) describes a further key assumption of such research, and cognitivism, 
is that the research process is facilitating access to relatively enduring and stable 
cognitive structures, which process information in predictable ways. As a result much 
of this research is based on the assumptions that beliefs, attitudes, and attributions 
remain stable from day to day and context to context. However, research conducted 
from a social constructionist epistemology conceptualizes language as productive 
and performative, hence the views that are expressed in these pieces of research 
are seen as 'dependent upon the discursive context within which they were 
produced', therefore beliefs or views expressed may vary dependent upon who the 
conversation is with as well as its aim (Willig, 2008, pp. 95; Burr 1995). Therefore, it 
is argued that these are prone to a social desirability bias by which participants tend 




1.11. Social Constructionist Informed Research 
However, despite this body of positivist, DSM-informed and largely quantitative 
based literature, there is an increasing number of qualitative studies  exploring the 
productive nature of language in relation to a variety of psychiatric constructs and 
practices. From a social constructionist perspective, the assigning of people to 
categories such as psychosis or schizophrenia, is considered a process of 
transforming a person's experiences to symptoms of a disorder followed by 
attributing a disorder to this person as an explanation of the experiences described 
(Georgaca, 2013). As opposed to an objective act of discovery of a pre-existing 
entity which resides inside the person and manifests itself in symptoms (Georgaca, 
2013; Boyle, 2002a). Therefore, several studies have focused on the use of 
diagnostic discourse in psychiatric services and its role in constructing social reality.  
Qualitative research has demonstrated how the assigning of a diagnosis can lead to 
a person's distress and difficulties being reformulated based upon biomedical 
assumptions (Barrett, 1996; Georgaca, 2013). A conversation analysis of 32 
consultations between psychiatrists and patients who had received diagnoses of 
either 'schizophrenia' or 'schizoaffective disorder', demonstrated how patients 
frequently 'actively attempted to talk about the content of their symptoms' (McCabe 
et al., 2002, p1150). However psychiatrists avoided answering questions indicating a 
reluctance to engage with concerns, instead they selectively focused upon 
systematically assessing frequency and severity of symptoms in relation to 
diagnostic criteria (McCabe et al., 2002). Such findings suggest interactions between 
psychiatrists and patients are defined by diagnostic classificatory systems such as 
the DSM-IV, and as such, pathology frameworks transform behaviour or expressions 
of distress into symptoms that are either present or absent (Jacobs & Cohen, 2010; 
Boyle, 2002a).  
In a Norwegian ethnographic study of 15 patients and 21 psychiatric professional in 
a psychiatric unit for young adults diagnosed with schizophrenia, Terkelsen (2009) 
demonstrated how psycho-educational treatment programmes informed by 
biomedical psychiatric assumptions led to patients adopting biomedical explanations 
for their experiences. In addition they assumed responsibility for looking after 
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themselves through the constant self monitoring of their condition and adherence to 
medication plans. Although, based upon field notes as the main method of data 
collection - and therefore open to the influence of the researchers’ background 
knowledge in the construction of the notes - it illustrates the influence of modern 
psychiatric treatment practices and technologies, such as diagnosis, upon the 
explanation of a distressed person’s subjectivity and experiences (Wolfinger, 2002; 
Georgaca, 2013).  
Other qualitative research has been conducted with a focus upon how diagnosis and 
classification inform professional discussions and practices, with a particular focus 
upon case formulations during team meetings and discussions.  
A narrative analysis of team meetings in a geropsychiatric unit demonstrated how 
professionals appear unaware they engage in clinical reasoning and decision making 
through a constructive process (Crepeau, 2000). During this process team member 
present often competing views, many of which contain themes such as, expected 
'sick roles', and moral tales. Griffith (1998) performed a thematic analysis upon 
transcripts of team meetings during which community mental health teams 
processed referrals. They described how differing discursive repertoires were made 
available to various professional disciplines based upon educational backgrounds 
and 'claims to disciplinary knowledge', e.g. medical versus non-medical 
professionals (Griffith, 1998, p. 697). These repertoires often lead to contrasting 
problem conceptualizations and treatment recommendations within a team. These 
studies appear to support the findings of a discourse analysis of verbal summaries 
made during psychiatric case summaries highlighting competing conceptualizations 
organised by two main narratives; biomedical accounts which construct patients as 
passive sufferers of a biochemical imbalance and support medical interventions, 
often in the form of medication; whereas on the other hand is a 'social accounts' 
which construct patients as an active agents with beliefs and intentions, and locates 
problems in the personal and social context of the individual, advocating 
interventions focused at a contextual level (Soyland, 1994, p.113; Georgaca, 2013).  
The research presented here demonstrates how the processes of diagnosis and the 
formulation of aetiology, is negotiated through the range of theoretical 
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understandings, and is contested within and between professional disciplines. These 
variable and often competing conceptualizations are influenced by a number of 
factors including professional training and the power of particular professional 
disciplines (Craven & Coyle, 2007; Boyle, 2002a; Georgaca, 2013). Furthermore the 
way mental health professionals talk is important in the construction of a patient’s 
identity, e.g. a passive sufferer of biochemical imbalances. Additionally how they lay 
claim to particular identities, as part professional groups, with claims to specific 
forms of expertise e.g. psychiatrists have expertise in diagnosis (Soyland, 1994). It 
can also be seen that these understanding of a person's distress also have various 
implications for professional action that is taken regarding interventions - this will be 
discussed in the next section.  
1.12. Clinical Implications  
As explored, although there are variable discourses drawn upon when 
conceptualising a patients experience of distress in mental health services, there is 
an apparent dominant biomedical construction when considering the aetiology of 
'psychosis' or 'schizophrenia'. Such a position has implications for those whose 
distress may be understandable in the context of adverse life experience, given that 
through a biomedical narrative experiences are seen as 'meaningless symptoms of 
an underlying mental illness and therefore not to be engaged with' (Georgaca, 2013; 
Boyle, 2002a). Harper (1999) suggests that the treatments offered by psychiatric 
‘experts’ to 'effect change' in the 'symptoms of psychosis' themselves are based 
upon certain assumptions as to the aetiology of psychosis (pp.11). This can be 
observed in how a 'disease centred model' has significantly influenced the how 
psychiatric services approach the clinical treatment of people who receive diagnoses 
of 'psychosis' (Bentall, 2003; Moncrieff, 2011). Antipsychotic medications are widely 
used as the first line treatment for virtually all forms of acute psychosis (Davis et al., 
1980). This is despite the many serious toxicities associated with the medications, 
with between 20 and 25% of people who take typical antipsychotic medication 
developing disorders of motor movement such as tardivedyskinesia (Gelenberg, 
1996). Bentall (2003) highlights that, despite the serious side effects and a 
substantial minority who do not gain any benefit, there has been little consideration 
of drug-free strategies for managing symptoms by modern psychiatric services. 
29 
 
Similarly, Read et al., (2004) claims the dominance of a biomedical model has 
impeded the discussion in psychiatric services of what is going on in people's lives, 
in their family relationships and the societies in which they live. Read et al. (2007), 
suggests this has led professionals failing to ask about traumatic life experiences in 
up to 69% of cases, despite patients expectations to be asked (Read et al., 2006). 
A number of qualitative studies have highlighted the central role of a biomedical 
discourse during accounts of often controversial psychiatric practices and treatment 
methods (Georgaca, 2013). Harper (1999), through a discourse analysis of talk from 
a psychiatrist’s account of apparent medication failure, explored how professional 
justification for the practice of prescribing medication relied upon a multifactorial 
account. This account positioned biology 'at the core' providing a biological basis for 
the patients 'symptoms' to be modified with medication, whilst justifying medication 
failure with a shift to a biopsychosocial accounts, such as 'personality patterns' 
(pp.16). Additionally, studies have highlighted a central role for biomedical 
discourses in the justification of controversial treatments including Electroconvulsive 
Therapy (ECT) (Stevens & Harper, 2007; Johnstone & Frith, 2005). In a discourse 
analysis of the interviews with eight psychiatric professionals, including six 
psychiatrists, Stevens and Harper (2007) reported how participants justified ECT by 
constructing recipients as severely ill, and stressing the biological basis and 
chronicity of their 'symptoms'. These studies also demonstrated how participants 
positioned themselves as expert medical practitioners who rationally apply medical 
procedures whilst objectively assessing the risks and benefits (Georgaca, 2013). 
The research presented demonstrates that, despite apparent acknowledgement of 
the importance of people's social situations and life experience in psychiatrists' 
aetiological formulations, the approaches taken to alleviate distress appear 
dominated by those with an exclusive focus upon individuals, based largely on the 
assumption of modifying internal pathology and are justified through biomedical 





1.13. Summary of Introduction 
Thus far, it has been argued that the understandings of the categories 'psychosis' 
and 'schizophrenia' have evolved within a particular cultural and historical climate, 
and through the technology of psychiatric classification systems have been 
repeatedly refined based upon the assumption that distressed individuals are acted 
upon by impersonal forces, usually a biological dysfunction, and therefore rendering 
their experiences as not meaningful or intelligible (Jacobs & Cohen, 2010; Boyle, 
2011). Furthermore that, empirical studies from both positivist and discourse analytic 
traditions highlight how the aetiological understandings of mental distress held by 
psychiatrists have implications for: psychiatric practices e.g., diagnosis and 
treatment; the identity of the people labelled as 'psychotic'; the meaning attributed to 
a person's distressing experiences; the lay understandings of such distress (Boyle, 
2011; Johnstone, 2011). In the case of psychosis, it appears psychiatrists 
understandings are dominated by a biomedical aetiological model. However, as 
outlined, there exists a body of research that challenges key biomedical assumptions 
underpinning the category of psychoses. In recent years, aetiological constructions 
in the area of psychosis have become an increasingly contested area driven by 
support for alternative paradigms that acknowledge the role of relational, societal 
and contextual explanations regarding the cause of peoples’ distress, particularly in 
relation to physical and sexual abuse (Harper, 1996; Johnstone, 2011). Despite this, 
there has been no research investigating how psychiatric professionals attempt to 
negotiate accounts the aetiology of a persons experiences of psychosis in the 
context of them having experienced 'trauma'. 
1.14. Rationale for Current Study 
 A review of existing literature suggested a need to examine the contextualised 
narratives of psychiatrists whilst they explore the role of trauma in the distress and 
problems of people who receive diagnoses of psychosis. Current conceptualisations 
of 'psychosis' and 'schizophrenia' are informed by positivist research which focuses 
upon biomedical assumptions of individual pathology (Harper, 1996). Thus, these 
models do not provide space for contextual factors, such as experiences of sexual or 
physical abuse, for which a well established body of literature has strongly linked to 
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experiences of distress labelled as 'psychosis' or 'schizophrenia'. This has important 
clinical consequences given that research indicates a professional's construction of 
aetiology influences the well-being of patients at a number of levels. Therefore, given 
the influential position psychiatrists have in mental health services, it is important to 
understand how they negotiate available discourses to construct their aetiological 
understandings and practices when considering the distress labelled as 'psychosis' 
in the context of trauma. By increasing awareness of the discursive factors 
influencing psychiatrists accounts it will contribute to the process of understanding 
the effects of particular aetiological constructions such as, the meaning attributed to 
a person's distress, and access to appropriate interventions (Read, 2004; Boyle, 
2002a).  
Discourse analyses of professional accounts have demonstrated the variability of 
explanations drawn upon in order to account for, diagnostic decisions, a variety of 
treatment decisions, and apparent medication failure (Harper, 1996, 1999; 
Georgaca, 2013). Additionally these have various rhetorical effects, such as 
transforming an individual's distressing experiences to symptoms of a psychiatric 
disorder (Georgaca, 2013). However as discussed, variation, disagreement and 
contradiction are limited through the methodological processes of the cognitive 
research which has dominated this area (Willig, 2008; Harper, 2007). In contrast, a 
social constructionist perspective sees language as an active agent in this process 
rather than passive, and would allow exploration of how this contested area is 
linguistically negotiated by psychiatrists by using a methodology such as discourse 
analysis (Harper, 1996, 1999). Harper (1996) highlights that 'mental health is an 
arena of discursive encounters' (pp.28), and advocates discourse analysis as a 
particularly useful approach to understanding how contested issues are constructed 
by participants due to its focus upon the 'inherent variability of accounts' (Stevens & 
Harper, 2007, p. 7). For example, how a psychiatrist may use rhetorical resources 
which make a biomedical understanding of 'psychosis' seem more reasonable than 
one based upon adverse life experiences (Boyle, 2002a, 2011). Discourse analysis 
therefore provides a novel perspective on the accounts of professionals (Harper, 
2007). 
Thus, by exploring psychiatrists' constructions of the diagnoses of psychoses using 
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discourse analysis, the current study hopes to shed light on how psychiatrists 
negotiate available discursive repertoires to construct accounts of the link between 
trauma and psychosis, and account for their practices in response to the disclosure 
of childhood or adolescent experiences of trauma. 
I will return to discussion of social constructionism and discourse analysis as an 
appropriate conceptual and methodological framework in the following chapter.  
1.14.1. Aims of the study 
Given the increasing attention upon alternative understandings of 'psychosis' in the 
context of increasing research as to a link with experiences of childhood and 
adolescent physical and sexual abuse; this research aimed to use a social 
constructionist perspective to bring an understanding of how the aetiological 
relationship between trauma and psychosis was linguistically mediated by 
psychiatrists. In doing so, the intention was to explore how a diagnosis of psychosis 
in the context of trauma was discursively produced and with what effects both for the 
psychiatrist and distressed person, as well as to shed light on the implications for 
practice (Harper, 1996, 1999). 
The forthcoming analysis in chapter three will seek to answer the following 
questions: 
Research questions: 
1. How do psychiatrists talk to construct their understanding of the aetiology of 
psychosis given the evidence of a link between the early experiences of 
psychological trauma to later experience of psychosis? 
 
2. Does a psychiatrist’s construction of psychosis have implications for the 
diagnosis and treatment of a person with psychotic experiences who 





CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the key theoretical assumptions that underlie the 
analysis used here and to outline how they are suited to the aims of the research. 
Alongside this, the epistemological framework is specified and how this informed the 
specific methods that were applied is considered. 
As will be discussed in more detail throughout the chapter, a critical realist approach 
to Discourse Analysis (DA) is adopted in this study which is closely allied with social 
constructionism (Burr, 1995). A central concern of social constructionist approaches 
to qualitative research is how people use language. A central tenet of such an 
approach is that language, rather than simply functioning as a passive vehicle that 
reflects concepts or constructs, is seen as constitutive, and taken-for-granted notions 
– such as 'schizophrenia' and 'trauma' – are questioned (Burr, 1995). The implication 
is that it is assumed that people's accounts are constructed (although not 
intentionally) and perform certain functions. As such language does not simply define 
concepts such as 'psychosis' and 'schizophrenia', but is actively creating their 
meaning. The constitutive nature of language can be seen through inconsistency 
and variability in talk, and this sheds light on how speakers draw on different 
linguistic repertoires (Harper, 1995, 1996, 1999). For example, Edwards and Potter 
(1992) have described how there are a variety of rhetorical strategies drawn upon 
during the construction of factual accounts (e.g. empiricist accounting).  
Although there will be some recognition of these rhetorical strategies in the analysis, 
research adopting a critical realist position goes beyond the text 'by setting what is 
said in a broader historical, cultural and social context (Harper, 2012, p. 93). By 
acknowledging the role of the extra-discursive, critical realist approaches enable the 
consideration of why people draw upon certain discourses (Sims-Schouten et al., 
2007). As such, a Foucauldian approach to DA will be drawn upon and will 
principally focus upon a 'wider sense of effects and consequences', with the 
assumption that the accounts likely serve certain institutional interests (Harper, 1999, 
p. 9). A key example of this in the current research relates to how different 
aetiological models are drawn upon depending upon the version of 'psychosis' being 
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constructed, and how the invoked aetiological model may serve to legitimate the 
actions of a particular profession (Harper, 1999). Again, this does not imply 
intentionality. This layer of analysis will have a predominant focus upon the ways in 
which talk about the relationship between trauma and psychosis constructs a 
number of subject positions for people, including users of psychiatric services and 
professionals (psychiatrists), whilst discursively producing a range of objects 
(Harper, 1996, 1999). Thus, by exploring psychiatrists' constructions of the 
diagnoses of psychoses using discourse analysis, the current study hopes to shed 
light on how psychiatrists negotiate available discursive repertoires to construct 
accounts of the link between trauma and psychosis, and account for their practices 
in response to the disclosure of childhood or adolescent experiences of trauma. 
2.2. Epistemology  
This section explores the rationale for adopting a critical realist social constructionist 
position during this study. Epistemological positions can be conceptualised along a 
continuum between two poles, namely 'realism' and 'relativism' (Harper, 2012).  
Generally, realism asserts that an external world exists independently of our 
representation of it (Searle, 1995). Whereas relativism holds that reality, or an 
external world, is not directly accessible and therefore it is not possible to make 
comments about the nature of 'reality' (Harper, 2012; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999). 
Social constructionism is considered relativist in several ways:  
'its scepticism about a direct relationship between accounts and reality, and its 
assumptions that we do not make direct contact with the world but, rather, our 
experience of it is mediated through culturally shared concepts - in other 
words, language shapes our experience of reality' (Harper, 2012, p. 91). 
Social constructionism broadly describes approaches which are 'principally 
concerned with explicating the processes by which people come to describe, explain, 
or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in which they live' (Gergen, 
1985,p. 266). Social constructionist researchers focus on exploring the variety of 
ways of constructing social reality which are available within a particular cultural and 
historical context, the conditions within which these ways of constructing are often 
used, and reflect upon the implications of these for those who are 'positioned' and 
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'subjectified' by these social constructions (Willig, 2008; Brown et al., 2011). 
However, social constructionism has been criticised for not adequately considering 
significant elements of human life including, embodiment, materiality and power 
(Cromby & Nightingale, 1999).  
The critical realist social constructionist epistemological position adopted in this 
study, combines constructionist and realist positions and holds that whilst 'meaning 
is made in interaction, non-discursive elements also impact on that meaning' (Sims-
Schouten et al., 2007, p. 102). Therefore it is considered a non-relativist approach to 
social constructionism (Willig, 1999). Within a critical realist social constructionist 
approach, language is understood as constructing our social realities and world, 
though there is an acknowledgement that 'these constructions are theorized as being 
shaped by the possibilities and constraints inherent in the material world' (Willig, 
2008; Sims-Schouten et al., 2007, p.102). As such language may not provide direct 
access to reality. Whilst emphasising the importance of discourse, critical realists do 
not regard it as the primary unit of analysis holding that there is more to the world 
than discourse and advocate an analytic focus that includes the non-discursive as 
well as the discursive. Such an approach allows the combination of constructionist 
and realist positions to propose that while meaning is made in interaction, non-
discursive elements also influence that meaning (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007). For 
example, the present research goes beyond the language used by psychiatrists to 
describe how they integrate the link between experiences of trauma and people 
receiving a diagnosis of psychosis, into their 'expert' understanding of the aetiology 
of psychosis. This allows acknowledgment of potentially unrecognised factors that 
might be influencing such constructions e.g. embodied factors. The advantages of 
taking a critical realist position in this research are: it allows consideration of the 
effects and functions of psychiatrists drawing upon certain discourses; it can explore 
the impact of material practices on discursive practices; and finally, it supports an 
ethical stance given that the analyses allows the contextualization of psychiatrist's 
talk by positioning it within the materiality that they have to negotiate (Sims-Schouten 
et al., 2007). This is an epistemological position that most closely mirrors that of 
mine. For example, I believe in the reality of the body as a 'biological machine that 
provides the material preconditions for subjectivity, thought, emotion and language' 
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(Nightingale & Cromby, 1999, p.10). However, I also believe that the meaning 
attributed to bodies varies across historical, cultural and social context (Nightingale & 
Cromby, 1999; Harper, 2012). 
There is several key criticism of this epistemological position which highlight a 
tension between relativist social constructionist and critical realist social 
constructionist positions (Willig, 2008). First, that the extra-discursive can be 
conceptualised as a discursive accomplishment (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007; Willig, 
2008). Secondly, that researchers working within a critical realist framework have no 
systematic method of distinguishing between the discursive and the non-discursive, 
and are therefore open to the influence of the researcher's political inclinations 
(Sims-Schouten et al., 2007). These issues will be explored further in the discussion 
section (Chapter 4). 
In adopting a critical realist social constructionist position in this research there will 
be an acknowledgement that the world is made up of social and material realities 
that play a role in structuring our actions, impose constraints on what we do or say, 
and therefore have implications on how we construct the world in particular contexts 
(Willig, 1999, 2008). These 'relatively enduring structures' cannot be directly 
accessed however, can be 'detected through their effects' (Willig, 1999, p. 45). This 
research will attempt to acknowledge 'extra-discursive' factors that, acting in 
conjunction with discursive practices, influence subjectivity (Willig, 1999; Fleetwood, 
2005, p.222). In order to address the concerns that critical realist approaches have 
no systematic method for distinguishing between the discursive and non-discursive, 
this research will draw on the recommendation of Sims-Schouten et al., (2007), who 
suggest an analytic focus on the following three extra-discursive factors; 
embodiment, institutions and materiality.  
A review of the literature presented in the introduction to this study, oriented the 
researcher to the identification of possible extra-discursive factors that may influence 
psychiatrists constructions of the relationship between trauma and psychosis. As 
such, the analysis of psychiatrists talk regarding the relationship between trauma 
and psychosis, will be concerned with the influence of embodied factors (e.g. 
subjective experience of asking about child abuse), the way the material world 
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shapes and informs social constructions (e.g. employment or current clinical role), 
and the power of institutional practices (e.g. policies and procedures for the 
treatment of psychosis) and practices such as the speaker's use of dominant 
discourses (e.g. the medical model of psychosis aetiology) (Cromby & Nightingale, 
1999).  
2.3. Reflexivity 
In constructionist research, it is important to remain aware of the researcher’s 
contribution to the co-production of data and that they are not merely a neutral 
observer (Willig, 2008; Silverman, 1997). It is therefore, important to explore ways by 
which the researcher's involvement 'influences, acts upon and informs' this research 
(Nightingale & Cromby, 1999, p.228). Willig (2008) highlights that there needs to be 
consideration of both personal and epistemological reflexivity. Personal reflexivity 
considers how the researcher’s values, beliefs, political aims and social identities 
have shaped this research. The recruitment, interview and analytic process have 
been influenced by the researcher's position as a clinical psychology trainee 
undertaking critical and qualitative research in a contested area as the construction 
of the aetiology of psychosis. This is particularly relevant when considering that the 
interviews are with psychiatric professionals whose training and practice is 
influenced greatly by 'naive realist' research which draws on positivist paradigms 
(Harper, 1996). At a personal level, the researcher is driven by a belief that the 
experiences of child and adolescent abuse and adversity survivors should be 
acknowledged and not pathologised. The researcher kept a research journal 
throughout this study to aid a process of reflexivity, this will be considered further in 
the discussion section. 
2.4. Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis can be seen as an umbrella term describing a variety of 
qualitative methods, with the chosen method being greatly dependent upon 'the 
epistemological framework being drawn upon' (Graham, 2005, p. 2). Common to all 
discursive approaches is that language is viewed as not simply describing 
psychological and social 'reality', but rather as constituting objects, events and 
experiences (Coyle, 2007). There is a growing body of research with a focus on 
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language use as social action (Harper, 1995). Language is viewed as constitutive 
and as something worthy of study in itself because of its effects (Harper, 1995, 1996, 
1999). Harper (1995) suggests that such an approach to DA is useful when exploring 
phenomena such as psychiatric categories (psychosis) that are largely produced 
within language (e.g. in ward rounds, diagnostic interviews, case discussions etc.). 
Furthermore, it is said that 'mental health is an arena of discursive encounters', and 
therefore DA is a useful approach to understanding how contested issues are 
constructed by participants due to its focus upon the 'inherent variability of accounts' 
(Harper, 1996, p.28; Stevens & Harper, 2007, p. 7). Importantly, a discursive 
approach is able to acknowledge how accounts serve a number of 'personal, 
interpersonal, social, institutional and societal interests' (Harper, 1995, p. 350). 
Therefore, rather than seeing discursive constructions as manifestations of a 
speakers 'underlying cognitive states', they are analysed in the context of their 
occurrence (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p.2). 
There are two main approaches to the study of discourse; discursive psychology 
(DP) which views language as a form of social action and is concerned with the 
'micro level' of discursive practice and the effects of these in interpersonal contexts 
(e.g. rhetorical devices and there use in the action orientation of talk); and 
Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) which focuses more upon the 'macro level' of 
discursive resources within a culture and its implications for those who live within it 
(e.g. how accounts of objects, events or experiences are located within wider cultural 
or institutional contexts) (Harper, 1996, 1999; Willig, 2008).  
Drawing upon the work of Harper (1999), there will be an acknowledgement of the 
rhetorical devices and strategies used by the speakers when talking about 
'psychosis' and 'trauma', with a particular focus upon strategies used by the speaker 
to produce discursive objects as real (Harper, 1999; Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
However, the primary focus of the analysis will be the linking of the participants’ talk 
with culturally available discourses and institutional power. Therefore, the analysis 
will be predominantly informed by a Foucauldian discursive analytic (FDA) principles 
which will be helpful in contextualising the use of language. FDA is interested in 
language beyond the immediate context of its use, focusing upon discourse in wider 
social processes of legitimation and power that can 'facilitate and limit, enable and 
39 
 
constrain what can be said, by whom, where and when' (Willig, 2003, p. 171). FDA's 
interest in language goes beyond the immediate context of its use by speaking 
subjects and, thus, asks questions about the relationship between 'discourse and 
how people think or feel (subjectivity), what they may do (practices) and the material 
conditions within which such experiences may take place' (Willig, 2008, p.113). FDA 
can be carried out on a wide range of texts including transcripts of interviews 
(Parker, 1999).  
2.4.1. Developing a critical realist approach to analysis informed by Foucauldian 
principles 
The method developed in this research was influenced by the suggestions made by 
Sims-Schouten, Riley and Willig (2007). They posit that a critical realist discourse 
analysis standpoint should be that the ways people understand themselves are 
structured by 'personal, psychological and social mechanisms', which offer a range 
of possible ways-of-being (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007, p.107). Influenced by this, the 
researcher selected a critical realist approach to FDA. This approach allows the 
consideration of material dimensions and thereby provides context as to why 'certain 
discourses is more or less easily enabled' (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007, p. 103). 
Further this approach not only allows the mapping of the ways 'participants use 
discourse to construct particular versions of reality', but also draws attention to how 
the materiality they have to negotiate influences their talk (Sims-Schouten et al., 
2007, p. 103).  
Accordingly, an analytic plan was developed with a primary focus upon the objects 
and practices by which the relationship between trauma and psychosis can be 
'problematized' (Foucault, 1985). Therefore, the researcher attempted to identify the 
discursive objects constructed through the talk of psychiatrists when exploring their 
professional experience of working with people diagnosed as psychosis who have 
disclosed experiences of trauma. Additionally, the research considered how the 
psychiatrists positioning of trauma and psychosis become constituted through certain 
discursive and material practices designed to exercise power over the self (Rose, 
1996). These practices have been defined as 'technologies of power and of the self', 
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including both the distal practices, such as professional knowledge, and proximal 
practices, such as diagnosis (Foucault, 1988). 
2.5. Ethical Considerations 
During the process of designing this research and formulating the research question 
I considered several political and ethical dimensions. To aid this process, several 
questions posed by Willig (2008) were held firmly in mind throughout, including; 'in 
whose interest is the research question, and how the answers to it may be used by 
individuals and organisations in society?' Importance was placed on such questions 
as this research may have implications for those taking part, as well as to clinical 
psychologists and people who may use psychiatric services. Furthermore, the 
researcher attempted to remain reflexive throughout this research as it is difficult to 
anticipate the ethical issues that might arise during the research process (Brinkmann 
& Kvale, 2008). Ethical approval for the research was granted by the ethics 
committee of the University of East London (appendix 2).  
At each stage of the recruitment process attempts were made to ensure participants 
were fully informed and had opportunities to opt-out. These ensured participants 
were actively volunteering to take part. The research adopted an 'opt-in' method, 
which required participants to actively make themselves available by choosing to 
respond to an initial email. At several stages during the recruitment and interview 
process, participants were given the opportunity to withdraw from the research and it 
was ensured they were as fully informed as possible, the researcher ensured: a) 
participants had read and understood the information sheet and they were offered 
the opportunity to clarify any areas of uncertainty (appendix 3); b) written consent 
form signed following it being explained by the researcher (appendix 4); c) 
participant were given the opportunity to ask questions about the research; d) 
confidentiality of information about participants; e) participants were provided with 
the contact details of the researcher should they wish to gain further information at a 
later date. It is again acknowledged that the concept of informed consent is difficult in 
research that has an open-ended and exploratory nature, however, at the end of 
each interview the participants were offered the opportunity to request the omittance 
of sections of the interview. 
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Regarding the researcher’s own positioning, the researcher introduced them self at 
the start of each interview as a trainee clinical psychologist based at the University of 
East London. Participants were encouraged at the start of the interview to speak 
freely and openly, and to express their own thoughts and experiences throughout the 
interview, this was further encouraged by the interviewer adopting a semi-structured 
interview style. Each interview began with the researcher beginning the interview 
with the statement that they were seeking the interviewee’s expertise and experience 
of working with people who had received a diagnosis of psychosis. 
2.6. Inclusion Criteria 
The selection of participant was limited to mental health psychiatrists currently 
working or recently worked in the U.K National Health Service. Core psychiatry 
training requires specific clinical experience of working with individuals with a 
diagnostic label of a psychotic disorder, therefore, this research did not exclude any 
qualified or in training psychiatrists. 
2.7. Recruitment 
Participants were recruited using an opportunist sampling method. An email was 
circulated to fellow University of East London clinical psychology trainees requesting 
they forward the email to psychiatrists they were in contact with. The email contained 
the following information; a short paragraph describing the research, a participant 
information sheet, consent form, ethical approval reference and the researchers 
contact information, and email address which can be used to confirm participation or 
to request further details of the research from the researcher. The rationale for this 
method was that clinical psychology trainees will have been on several placements 
across the North Thames region of London and will have had professional contact 
with psychiatrists. Following an expression of interest from a psychiatrist they were 
invited to attend an interview at a time convenient for themselves.  
2.8. Participants 
Seven psychiatrists were recruited to participant in this study. This was considered to 
be a sufficient sample size given that the interviews were expected to last in region 
of 60 minutes. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest small sample sizes are most 
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suitable for qualitative research as they allow in-depth study of people in their 
context. Morse (1994) suggested at least six participants were required for saturation 
of data content to be reached. Furthermore, Discourse analyses do not make claims 
of representativeness of samples (Coyle, 2007). By not limiting the sample to 
psychiatrists working primarily with people who had a diagnosis of psychosis, it was 
hoped that participants with a range of experience and material circumstances would 
be attracted. As previously mentioned,  this was not consider a problem as all 
psychiatrists must undergo a core training placement working with people with a 
diagnosis of psychosis. 
The sample was comprised of five women and two men, aged between 25-34 and 
55-64 years old. The participants were at a range of stages in their careers, one at 
ST4, one at CT1, three fully qualified, two consultants psychiatrists, and one retired 
consultant psychiatrist (first year of retirement). The participants were currently 
employed in a range of clinical settings; one in an early intervention for psychosis 
team, one in a crisis resolution team, one in a child and adolescent community team, 
one in an older adult team, two in a community learning disabilities team, and one 
recently retired from an acute outpatients team. Five of the participants were 
currently working with people who had frequently received diagnoses of psychosis.  
2.9. Data Collection  
Data for the study was collected by the researcher through the medium of semi-
structured interviews with the participants. Interviews were chosen as the data 
collection method because the study is interested in how professionals construct 
accounts of the relationship between trauma and psychosis, for example how they 
might provide justification for a particular aetiological model. It was considered that 
interviews would allow the inclusion of each participant's views, and would provide 
an opportunity to explore the individual psychiatrist's perspectives in detail using their 
own language (Frith & Gleeson, 2012). In addition, interviews do not require the 
sampling of data from a large number of people and therefore were considered more 
manageable for the scope of this research (Coyle, 2007).  
Potter and Hepburn (2005) have drawn attention to several problematic features that 
are considered a necessary part of doing interviews. These problems include: 
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interactional features, such as its status as a conversation between two people; and 
the stake and interest that both participants have in the interview (Potter & Hepburn, 
2005; Willig, 2008). It was therefore important to not assume the interviewee's words 
directly reflected their thoughts and feelings (Willig, 2008). Instead, the interviews 
were regarded as an arena where culturally available discourses and rhetorical 
strategies would be at work (Potter, 1996). 
The interviews followed an agenda that was produced beforehand and were 
structured according to the studies questions and aims. The questions were 
methodically generated by basing them upon a review of existing literature and 
through discussion with the research supervisor (appendix 5). The agenda consisted 
of a small number of topic headings, around which the researcher formulated 
questions during the course of the interview based upon the responses from the 
participant. This allowed the incorporation of the interviewee's own terms and 
concepts into the questions. The intention of using this method was to make the 
questions more relevant to the interviewee as well as to maintain continuity and 
rapport throughout the interview. The topics were aimed at prompting participants’ 
accounts of the context and experience of working with people diagnosed with 
psychosis who have experienced childhood or adolescent trauma. Specifically, the 
main topic areas that were discussed in each interview were: the aetiological models 
that the participants drew upon; and the diagnosis, treatment and prognosis of 
people who have been diagnosed with psychosis and who disclose childhood 
experiences of trauma.  
The researcher aim was to encourage diverse accounts during the interviews. 
Therefore participants were encouraged to give voice to what otherwise might be 
assumed to be implicit assumptions and expectations. The interviewer attempted to 
keep questions as short as possible and allow the interviewee the space to give full 
answers, encouragement such as, "Could you tell me more" were used to facilitate 
richer responses to relevant areas (Kvale, 1996).  
All participants chose to be interviewed at their place of employment. The interviews 
ranged in length between 32 minutes to 1 hour and 5 minutes, with the average 
interview lasting around 52 minutes. The latest potential finishing time of the 
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interview was negotiated at the beginning and was usually dictated by the 
participant’s schedule. 
2.10. Transcription 
The researcher transcribed all interviews verbatim using simplified transcription 
criteria adapted from Potter and Wetherell (1987) (appendix 6). This style and level 
of transcription was deemed suitable given that this study was not predominantly 
focussed on the micro level features, instead the focus was upon the broader 
discursive constructions (Malson, 1998). 
2.11. Process of Analysis 
Having made notes in my reflective journal during the transcription stage (examples 
appendix 8), I identified a starting point for the analysis by articulating a question 
based upon the research aims: 
"Under what circumstance are the relationships between trauma and psychosis 
rendered problematic and what official discourses and counter-discourses render 
these problems visible and intelligible?" 
The process of analysis was informed by six analytic stages described by Willig 
(2008) and informed by Arribas-Allyon & Walkerdine (2008), and Harper (1999). 
1. Discursive constructions: Highlight all the instances of reference to the 
discursive objects of 'psychosis' and 'trauma'. How are psychosis and trauma 
constructed through language, and what type of object is being constructed? 
What linguistic repertoires are evident when talking about 'psychosis' and 
'trauma' including, rhetorical devices and strategies used by the speakers 
(Harper, 1999; Edwards and Potter, 1992).  
2. Discourses: Location of the various constructions of psychosis and trauma 
within wider discourses. Under what circumstances and by whom are aspects 
of psychosis and trauma rendered problematic? According to what moral 
domains or judgements are these concerns allowed to circulate? What official 




3. Action orientation: What is gained or achieved from constructing psychosis 
and trauma a particular way at a particular point in the text? What 
technologies of power and of the self are evidenced in psychiatrists talk and 
how do they enable psychiatrists to make sense of interactions with people 
who have experienced childhood trauma and are diagnosed with psychosis? 
4. Subject positions: A location for persons within a structure of rights and duties 
for those who use that repertoire (Davies and Harre, 1999. p.35). How does 
the subject position of a psychiatrist and their location within a structure of 
rights and duties, allow them to speak the truth about the link between trauma 
and psychosis. How does this subject position offer a perspective from which 
to view a version of reality, but also a moral location within spoken interaction 
with others? 
5. Practice: By constructing particular versions of psychosis and trauma what 
possibilities for action are mapped out by them? What can be said and done 
from within these subject positions? 
6. Subjectivity: At this stage there is an attempt to make links between the 
discursive constructs used of trauma and psychosis and their implications for 
subjective experience. How are psychiatrists formed via technologies of 
power and self, and how do they engage in practices of self regulation to 
transform themselves in order to attain a state that allows them to remain in a 
position of responsibility? (Foucault, 1988). 
From the initial coding stage where the transcripts were read and reread, several 
major 'discursive sites' were identified which appeared to account for the groups of 
constructions identified (example of coding appendix 7). Providing these stages of 
analysis is attempt reduce ambiguity by being explicit about the process followed. 
Although by presenting these stages there is an attempt to orientate the reader to 
the process of analysis, I acknowledge the 'multiplicity of interpretations' available 
when interrogating the text, and it is stressed that this research presents a reading of 
the data and is not the only possible reading (Willig, 2008; Graham, 2005, p.5).  
The next chapter will report, explore and discuss the outcome of the analysis.  
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CHAPTER 3 - ANALYSIS 
In this section there is an examination of some of the interview extracts. This 
examination is driven by the research questions outlined in the aims of this research. 
Initially, the analysis of the interview extracts is concerned with the aetiological 
models that are drawn upon by the psychiatrists to construct the relationship 
between trauma and psychosis. In the second section, the extracts are analysed with 
respect to the practices that are supported by the constructions that are drawn upon 
by the psychiatrists. Although these analysis sites are presented in separate sections 
they should not be considered as mutually exclusive, but instead as an 
interconnected network of discursive practices which work together to produce the 
concept of trauma and its relationship with psychosis (Morrison, 2003; Rose, 1979).  
This analysis section focuses upon the analysis of the interviews in the context of 
wider cultural and professional culture, and concerns the aetiological models which 
are drawn upon by psychiatrists to consider the relationship between trauma and 
psychosis. Following this the analysis will consider the consequences of and 
possibilities opened up by these constructions e.g., treatments, and subject and 
object positions (Willig, 2001). Extracts from the participants' transcripts will be used 
to illustrate how constructions are made possible, the subject positions, and the 
social practices enabled by them (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). 
It is not possible to comment on all of the features of each extract, therefore I have 
focused upon those most relevant to the research aims.  
3.1. Discursive Constructions of 'Trauma' and 'Psychosis' 
Although the main focus of this analysis will be upon the how psychiatrists construct 
the relationship between trauma and psychosis, this initial section will foreground this 
by exploring what the terms 'trauma' and 'psychosis' were used to describe in the 
interviews and to what effect. This section will be necessarily brief, given it is not the 
main aim of this analysis, and is intended only to draw attention to the variability of 




3.1.1. Definitional constructions of 'trauma' 
This section is intended to orientate the reader to the use of the term 'trauma' within 
the interviews and briefly point to a few possible effects of its use. 
3.1.1.1. Trauma as an objective entity as operationally defined by the ICD 10 or DSM 
 Extract 1: 
Dr F: you look at ICD 10 and DSM /Res: mm/ you know it’s [trauma] linked to, 
having as I say, being caught up in an earthquake, tsunami, you know major 
stuff (997-999). 
This extract is an example of how 'trauma' was constructed through reference to the 
psychiatric classification systems 'ICD 10 and DSM' (line 997) (APA, 1994; WHO, 
2010).  Features of this repertoire were seen in several of the psychiatrists accounts 
(Dr F line 997; Dr A line 231; Dr B line 204).  An effect of locating 'trauma' within a 
professional discourse of psychiatric classification is that adverse experiences such 
as, 'being caught up in an earthquake', are incorporated into a pathology framework 
which considers them as separate from the human world and are evaluated without 
regard to circumstances (Jacobs and Cohen, 2010). Furthermore, by drawing upon 
psychiatric classification definitions of trauma, notions of objectivity and individualism 
are privileged (Patel, 2011). The effect of this is to construct a 'traumatized individual' 
who becomes the focus of practices concerned with diminishing psychological 
distress. Such a position directs focus away practices that might address causes, 
and consequently neglects exploration of the contextual factors that may influence 
distress such as poverty, access to education and racism (Johnstone, 2011; Patel, 
2011). This perhaps represent a societal technology of power that limits exploration 
of the conditions that make possible the physical, sexual and emotional abuse, as 







3.1.1.2. Trauma as severe stress 
 Extract 2:  
Dr A: trauma is one of the umm, like it’s one of the (.) It’s, it’s a huge stressor, 
compared to a lot of other stress I would consider trauma to be much higher 
degree of stress (96-98). 
As in this extract, several of the psychiatrists construct trauma as synonymous with 
"severe stress" or as a 'huge stressor', this was a theme pervasive throughout the 
accounts (e.g. Dr G line 165; Dr A, line 96). This draws upon a positivist 
epistemological discourse which constructs trauma as having a 'dose effect', with 
exposure to particular event having an increasing universally objectifiable risk of 
experiencing a distressing reaction (Mollica, 2000). Furthermore, the equating of 
traumatic experiences with stress was associated with conceptualisations of distress 
that draw upon a vulnerability-stress discourse, whereby 'stress' is positioned as a 
'trigger'. An effect of doing so is to position adverse life experience as the equivalent 
of a trigger for an underlying individual pathology or illness, thereby simultaneously 
stripping its meaning for that person (Johnstone, 2011). Furthermore, the technical 
terms 'trauma' and 'stress' allow the subject to avoid having to describe the events in 
detail, as well as having to engage with any personal meaning they may have for the 
survivor (lines 96, 98) (Boyle, 2011).  
3.1.1.3. Trauma as term to convey complex damaging experiences 
 Extract 3:  
Dr G: trauma usually suggests something, severe stress /Res: uhuh/ in a 
person’s life, um, this kind of trauma could be anything like sexual abuse, 
physical abuse, emotional abuse (165 -168). 
Here, 'sexual' and 'physical' and 'emotional abuse' are used as examples of both 
'trauma' and 'stress'. This was common to all of the psychiatrists interviewed (e.g. Dr 
F, 1000 ;Dr B, 209, 378; Dr D, 357; Dr G, 168). This perhaps represents how the 
construct of 'trauma' and its synonyms such as 'stress' have become embedded in 
psychiatric language to convey the complexity of harmful interpersonal and relational 
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patterns (Boyle, 2006). There are several effects of this construction; whilst 
acknowledging severe psychosocial factors it simultaneously fails to acknowledge a 
wide range of everyday but possibly damaging experiences such as racism, or family 
communication problems (line 165) (Johnstone, 2011; Boyle, 2006). Secondly, it 
allows the psychiatrist to summarize people's experiences whilst avoiding detailed 
description of the often shocking detail of people's experiences (Boyle, 2006). 
3.1.2. Definitional Constructions of Psychosis 
Again this section is intended to orientate the reader to the use of the term 
'psychosis' within the interviews and briefly point to a few possible effects of its use. 
A more detailed analysis occurs throughout the later analysis sections, where some 
of the issues raised will be explored further. This section is closely based on the 
observations of Mary Boyle (2006). 
3.1.2.1. Psychosis as synonymous with schizophrenia 
 Extract 4: 
 Dr A: So there’s this typical psychosis that represents, that, that starts later in 
life and a very schizophrenia like feeling, that disconnection of affect, true 
hallucinations, real paranoia, responding to stimuli umm, and whatever the 
causes, if you forget the aetiology, it looks like true psychosis (184-189). 
This extract demonstrates how, what is called here 'typical psychosis' is seen as 
synonymous with the diagnostic category 'schizophrenia' (Boyle, 2006). The effect of 
this construction is to implicitly transfer to the label 'psychosis' the taken-for-granted 








3.1.2.2. Psychosis as a generic noun 
 Extract 5: 
 Dr D: (.) Well, I mean I would adhere to the convention of erm, criteria for 
diagnosing erm, psychosis er, in terms of the usual need for delusions, 
hallucinations, possibly thought disorder er, of a particular duration and of 
which will often be distressing, impair function, possibly you know risk to self 
and others associated, and some combinations of those aspects, but 
particularly central features of abnormal experiences, abnormal beliefs, 
abnormalities of thought (7-11). 
This extract demonstrates how psychosis was used in the interviews as a generic 
term, within which exists a diagnosis 'schizophrenia'. Commonly there was a reliance 
upon the biomedical language of symptoms such as, 'thought disorder' and 
'hallucinations' and 'diagnosis' (lines 8-9) (Harper, 1996). The effect of using 
psychosis this way is that the traditional biomedical assumptions of schizophrenia 
remain unchallenged and potentially assimilated (Boyle, 2006). 
3.1.2.3. Psychosis to avoid the use of 'schizophrenia' 
 Extract 6: 
Res: if you’re kind of explaining psychosis to someone, how would you do 
that? 
Dr G:That's a very interesting point isn’t, especially we have people with first 
episode psychosis /Res: mmm/ we don’t want to scare them off_/res: sure, 
yeah/_ erm with terms like schizophrenia /Res: mmm/ which does not mean 
much really, erm there’s been quite a lot of debate about whether this should 
be changed (19-31). 
In this extract the term 'psychosis' allows the avoidance of the negative perceptions 
and stigma that surround the term 'schizophrenia'. This perhaps represents how 
'psychosis' is used as a more user-friendly and less stigmatizing diagnosis in mental 
health services (Johnstone, 2011). Here psychosis is perceived by the speaker as a 
less threatening descriptor of the associated distressing experiences, whilst the 
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possibility of a future diagnosis of schizophrenia remains. Furthermore, there is an 
assumption that psychosis has more meaning to the distressed person, whilst the 
language and assumptions traditionally associated with schizophrenia remain 
unchallenged and possible transferred to that of psychosis.  
3.1.2.4. Psychosis as an independent concept 
 Extract 7: 
Dr F: Psychosis is kind of the disturbance of a person's relationship with the 
real world. So it’s an abnormal_ the abnormalities include abnormalities of 
thinking, of mood, behaviour (43-45). 
In this extract, the term 'psychosis' is used without reference to 'schizophrenia'. The 
speaker constructs 'psychosis' as a generic concept that accounts for a change or 
'disturbance' in the way a person relates to an apparently rationally objectifiable 'real 
world' (line 43) (Georgaca, 2013). Although the effect of such a construct is space for 
conceptualizations that are not limited by the assumptions of schizophrenia, there is 
a focus upon individual psychological and behavioural consequences of psychosis, 
such a focus does not offer space to consider causal factors such as trauma (Boyle, 
2006).   
3.2. Constructions of the Relationship Between Trauma and Psychosis 
The previous section has offered a brief analysis of some of the ways in which 
'trauma' and 'psychosis' were conceptualised in the interviews, and how the 
particular version being drawn upon offers differing understandings of the 
phenomena being described.  
In this section there is an examination of how the psychiatrists variably construct the 
experiences of people diagnosed with psychosis in the context of trauma, by drawing 
upon three theoretical approaches namely; biological (or biomedical), psychological 
and social. These theoretical orientations are aspects of what is known as a 
'biopsychosocial' model of the causation of distress (Engle, 1980). Presented in this 
section are examples of how the psychiatrists spoke about individual aspects of such 
a model  when considering the aetiology of psychosis in the context of experiencing 
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trauma in a person's life e.g., biomedical aspects. This section also includes an 
example of how these aspects were constructed in relation to each other to provide 
an integrated and multifactorial aetiological narrative of the relationship between 
trauma and psychosis. 
 
The role of trauma is spoken about differently depending upon which aspect of the 
biopsychosocial model is being drawn upon. There has been an attempt to show 
each of these discourses in action individually, though there is inevitably some 
overlap in their deployment.  
 
3.2.1. Trauma as a trigger to a biogenetic vulnerability 
 
 In constructing the aetiology of psychosis in the context of traumatic experiences, 
various accounts were deployed that served to produce trauma as a 'trigger' to a 
biogenetic vulnerability to developing 'psychosis'. These constructions enabled a 
variety of practices in terms of how the psychiatrist might respond to a person who is 




Res: you describe kind of a 'true psychosis' and erm kind of more say for 
instance a psychosis that's maybe more around PTSD, do you, do you 
consider, do you have different aetiological models for each of those, or 
and do you think that maybe trauma is maybe associated with one more 
than the other? (250-255). 
 
Dr B: My understanding of it is that erm, (.) if the person has certain er 
genetical background with the exposure to certain degree of trauma this 
person will develop a certain illness, so basically if I'm genetically 
programmed to develop schizophrenia in the case of exposure to certain 
degree of distress then I will become schizophrenic, if I'm programmed 
genetically not to develop psychosis, true psychosis, schizophrenia let's 
talk about schizophrenia let's talk about schizophrenia yea, it,it,it's, if I do 
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not carry genes which predispose me to dopamine dysfunction in my 
brain, severe dopamine dysfunction severe dopamine excess in my 
mesolimbic system then, I will be, even when exposed to severe stress 
during my childhood I will probably be less likely to develop schizophrenia 
but I will be more likely to develop er er trauma related emotional er er 
instability, which will manifest in all sorts of behavioural outcomes of er 
behavioural symptoms of, of er borderline PD (256-270). 
 
In this extract, the psychiatrist is responding to a question regarding the aetiological 
models drawn upon when conceptualising psychosis and PTSD. The speaker begins 
the account by offering the following qualification, 'My understanding of it is that' (line 
256). This is a useful rhetorical strategy when exploring contested areas, in this case 
the relationship between trauma and psychosis. By doing so, the psychiatrist is able 
to manage challenges to their formulation by responding that it was only their 
understanding that was being offered (Edwards & Potter, 1992). The psychiatrist 
goes on to develop an 'empiricist account' which draws upon scientific language 
including 'genetical background', 'genes', 'dopamine dysfunction', 'mesolimbic 
system', 'symptoms' (lines 257, 263, 265 & 270), to construct a biomedical account 
of how trauma is linked to psychosis (Edwards & Potter 1992). The use of this highly 
specialised objective language has several effects. First, by giving agency to 
physical events, such as brain chemistry and genetic markers, which are considered 
to be objectively indicative of a diagnosis of schizophrenia, an impression is fostered 
that 'schizophrenia' is an organic disease (line 263). Second, such language is part 
of a technical rational repertoire, limiting or rendering inaccessible meaning to non-
specialists (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Boyle, 2002a). It has been suggested that such 
language can contribute to an impression of reasonableness around this particular 
version by presenting what appear to be facts as if they have been discovered and 
verified (Coyle, 2007). Furthermore, the reference to becoming 'schizophrenic' (line 
261) gives the impression of the attributes, and the role of trauma in this area, as 
applying to all those who fall into the 'schizophrenic' category, therefore allowing a 
generalisation to, or the homogenisation of, all people who have received such a 




In addition, here Dr B draws on a metaphor of programming, 'so basically if I'm 
genetically programmed to develop schizophrenia in the case of exposure to certain 
degree of distress'(line 259). Thereby a sense of predetermined biogenetic function 
or vulnerability is reinforced, a position consistent with a stress-vulnerability 
discourse whereby trauma is constructed as a trigger to a primary cause of distress 
that lies in the biology of the individual. Therefore, although trauma is acknowledged, 
agency is primarily located in the predetermined biology of the individual - namely 
their genetics - whilst the patient is seen as passive. Within such an account the 
assignment of agency to the individual’s internal biology has the effect removing 
agency from other potentially influential actors such as, survivors, family members, 
health services etc., and positions agency with internal biology of the individual 
(Harper, 1996).   
Such a construction of the role of trauma can be found in other accounts in the 
transcripts for example; 
  'I wouldn’t think of a trauma as a cause of a psychotic illness /Res: right yeah/ 
 I would think of it as a trigger’ (Dr E, 722-723).  
 
Again, in this extract, trauma is explicitly referred to as a 'trigger' that is alone 
insufficient to cause 'psychotic illness' (line 723). Therefore, by constructing trauma 
as analogous to a trigger, psychotic illness is positioned as an object that exists over 
and above a natural and understandable reaction to a trauma, and is a disease 
process which emerges or is made worse by the trauma. Both extracts construct the 
presence of 'trigger' or 'exposure to certain degree of distress' as not sufficient in 
themselves to produce serious emotional distress (Boyle, 2011). By implication 
psychosis is constructed as something inevitable and beyond the control of the 
individual or society. Furthermore, experiences that may constitute trauma are 
therefore made meaningful, without having to explore the social or cultural context in 
which they occur (Patel, 2011). 
  
Through repeated  reference to a biomedical discourse of diagnoses by the use of 
the terms 'schizophrenia' and 'borderline P.D' (lines 259 & 270), there is an 
assumption of a disorder that is located within the individual, and therefore indicative 
of a biological cause (Harper, 1996). An individual, as opposed to social, nature of 
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'schizophrenia' is further emphasised through reference to 'genetical background', 
'illness', and 'genetically programmed' (lines 257-259), which contribute to an 
impression of a pathological individual whose actions, thoughts and feelings are the 
consequence of internal properties. Furthermore this construction of a person's 
problems or distress as originating beneath the skin legitimates practices which 
target beneath the skin solutions, such as chemical interventions (Cromby & 
Nightingale, 2001). It also leads to what might otherwise be viewed as 
understandable reactions to life's challenges to being de-contextualised and instead 
transformed into internal individual pathology, with an accompanying label of 
'psychosis' (Bracken & Thomas, 1995).  
 
A further effect of the individual internalised construction dominant in this extract can 
be noted in the comment, 'which will manifest in all sorts of behavioural outcomes of 
er behavioural symptoms of' (line 269). Here little attention is paid to the content of a 
particular phenomenon or experience. Instead a diagnostic classification framework 
transforms behaviour into symptoms, classifiable as either present of absent (Barret, 
1988; Harper, 1996). This medical imperative seeks to abstract generalities and 
commonalities, with psychiatric knowledge de-contextualising patients' experiences, 
by assuming that their meaning and function are not particularly relevant (Harper, 
1996). Boyle (2002a) proposes that the pre-occupation with form over content is 
driven by the assumption that content is meaningless when compared to clinicians', 











3.2.2. Trauma as leading to an acquired vulnerability to develop psychosis  
In constructing the aetiology of psychosis in the context of traumatic experiences, a 
variation of a stress-vulnerability account was deployed which constructed early life 
experiences of trauma as leading to an acquired vulnerability to future psychosis, 
drawing heavily upon theoretical ideas from psychological theory. 
Extract 9: 
Res: how did you kind of fit the ideas that you receive in family therapy 
[training] and kind of theoretical ideas around why people might become 
distressed with the, with your psychiatric views, or the kind of I guess 
more medical model ideas of distress as well, particularly in er_in the case 
of psychosis? (347-351). 
Dr D: you can only imagine that lots of things that should of happened for 
that person, brain wise, hasn't happened /Res: Sure/ you know, the kinds 
of connections the kinds of building up of the wiring if you like hasn't 
happened /Res: mmm/ and therefore they are, they're predisposed to (.) 
these kinds of distorting, distortions of perception or of belief that we call 
psychosis, or language disruption we call thought disorder. And on top of 
that the sort of suffering going with it you know, and also perhaps the lack 
of confidence in managing their lives, they haven't learnt or built up those 
confidences, and kind of coping mechanisms, problem solving er, 
mechanisms that would normally happen for most people who were 
brought up with what you might call adequate care and protection from err 
excessive traumatic experience /Res: mmm/ (403 - 420). 
Here, whilst responding to a question regarding integrating theory learnt in family 
therapy training into a medical model of distress, the psychiatrist constructs a 
narrative of a link between adverse life experiences - in this case ' sexual abuse, 
physical abuse, emotional abuse' (mentioned earlier in the exchange, line 356) - and 
experiences labelled as 'psychosis', drawing upon a vulnerability-stress hypothesis 
discourse (Zubin & Spring, 1977). The speaker constructs a vulnerability, or 
'predisposition', as an acquired neurological deficit saying, 'building up of the wiring if 
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you like hasn't happened' in the persons brain (lines 405-406), and links this with 
childhood experiences of abuse (line 356). In contrast to the biogenetic vulnerability 
constructed by Dr B (section 3. 2.1), here the vulnerability is constructed as 
environmentally acquired, and as leaving the individual at risk or 'predisposed' to 
developing 'psychosis' (lines 407-408). In doing so, the psychiatrist acknowledges 
the potentially damaging effects of adverse environments (Boyle, 2011). However 
simultaneously, there are several features of this extract which have the effect of 
decontextualising and transforming the person’s more or less understandable 
reactions to life challenges into internal individual pathology (Rapley et al., 2011). 
First, through the use of structural metaphors such as 'building' and 'wiring', Dr D 
coveys a permanence and irreversibility of the neurological deficit, referred to as 'the 
things that should have happened for that person, brain wise' (line 404). The use of 
these metaphors offers the possibility of knowledge of an unseen realm below the 
surface that cannot be verified, but only made visible through observation of 
apparent surface manifestations, or signs,  and which require verification through the 
knowledge and skills of psychiatric 'experts' (i.e. 'thought disorder') (Harper, 1996, 
1999). Additionally, this is combined with the temporal positioning of negative 
experiences and the neurological ('brain' (line 404)) effects in the past, which creates 
a sense of remoteness and irreversibility (Boyle, 2011). It has been suggested that 
such a positioning is commonly used as a rhetorical device to justify the lack of 
attention paid to such experiences in psychiatric services, through a 'damage is 
done' discourse (Read et al., 2004; Boyle, 2011).  
Second, a cognitive behavioural discourse is drawn upon, linking the experience of 
'care' and 'protection' (lines 414-415), or the lack of in this case,  as influencing 
intrapsychic variables or psychological structures such as, 'coping mechanisms' or 
'confidence' (line 412). By doing so, a discourse of an individual victim is privileged 
over a discourse of social, with the effect of positioning trauma as disrupting the 
individual’s life by influencing purely internal phenomena (Kleber et al., 1995; Beck, 
1996; Sampson, 1981; Harper, 1996). This discourse promotes solutions that are 
focused upon the individual as opposed to those that might focus upon systems or 
context-specific factors that may affect distress, with this being reinforced by the 
remoteness of the events leading to the 'predisposition' (Cromby & Nightingale, 
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2001; Harper, 1999). Furthermore, the influence of traumatic experiences are 
positioned as 'predisposing' to, and the deficits in the functioning of internal 
psychological phenomena are positioned as 'in addition to', bizarre experiences such 
as, 'distortions of perception' associated with 'psychosis', by saying, 'on top of' (line 
409). This formulation maintains a separation of mental phenomenon associated 
with psychosis from background contexts of the person, thus giving a sense of a 
person's social context as operating in isolation (Thomas & Bracken, 2004). By 
maintaining this separation the 'psychosis' and 'thought disorder' are positioned as 
individual pathology that requires additional explanation, over and above these 
experiences being the effect of abuse (Johnstone, 2007).  
In this extract, the focus on diagnosis and a discourse of internalised pathology, 
neglects how a trauma discourse regulates survivors subjectivities by placing an 
emphasis upon vulnerability as a predisposition to a psychiatric diagnosis or 'lack of 
confidence in managing their lives' (lines 410-411), rather than 'resilience, survival 
and agency' (Patel, 2011). This perhaps represents the difficulty faced by mental 
health professionals in acknowledging both the individual and society. Harper (1996) 
suggests that privileging the individual itself is not sufficient given that the individual 
only exists 'against a background of society'. However a solely social and 
interactional account of madness can 'appear too abstract to theorize subjectivity', 
and sheds light on the who is doing the abusing and the social and cultural systems 
which facilitate it which can feel extremely overwhelming to professionals (Harper 










3.2.3. Social context as a stressor  
In the accounts there were various constructions that drew upon sociological 
theoretical ideas when talking about the relationship between trauma and psychotic 
experiences. This extract provides an example in which the psychiatrist is referring to 
more 'mundane' adverse life experience, such as arguments with family member, as 
opposed to the more typically referred to experiences of physical or sexual abuse. 
Additionally, as demonstrated in the section 3.1.1.2, trauma is seen as synonymous 
with stress. 
Extract 10:  
Res: are there particular, are there particular models that you use or that 
you find most helpful when thinking about that [psychosis]? (92-94). 
Dr G: then we have issues of just stress factors, which clearly we see in 
our patients, when there’s social stress, housing, benefits, whatever, they 
have a relapse /Res: uhuh/ and whether what you do with that, whether 
you resolve all the social issues immediately or whether you treat them 
[the patient] with medication and then deal with the, it’s a different matter, 
but but stress is an important factor (res: uhuh), then you are looking at, 
these are immediate stress we are talking about just before the onset of 
the illness [psychosis] and that leads on to, you know it may be um, some 
arguments with a family member, but it has roots /Res: uhuh/ from the 
past (109-122). 
In this extract, whilst responding to a question regarding aetiological models, the 
psychiatrist uses terms from both sociological and biological theoretical frameworks 
to explore how current 'stress factors' which may be influenced by 'past' experiences 
can be linked with a person receiving a diagnostic label of 'psychosis' (lines 109, 
122). Sociological influences upon distress appear to be positioned as 'stress 
factors', with stress factors being contextual influences that are either distal such as, 
'housing' or 'benefits' (lines 112, 113), or proximal such as, 'arguments with a family 
member' (line 121) (Smail, 2001). Simultaneously, biomedical language is used such 
as, 'relapse' or 'illness', which has the effect of positioning 'stress factors', and 
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therefore the person’s social context, as influencing an underlying biological 
mechanism (lines 114, 120, 112). In addition, the psychiatrist separates 'stress' from 
'illness' by saying 'just before the onset of the illness' (line 120), in doing so, it is 
implied that the 'illness' is caused by other things, rather than the stress being a 
sufficient explanation for the persons distress (Boyle, 2011). 
Throughout the patient is constructed as a passive agent in several ways. First, 
social 'stress' is constructed as an external object, such as 'housing' or 'benefits', 
with agency to resolve such issues as external to the patient and with the 'expert',  
indicated by saying, 'whether you [professional] resolve all the social issues' (lines 
115-116). Simultaneously, although the influence social context is acknowledged, its 
effects are decontextualised by explicitly locating it them within the individual saying, 
'which clearly we see in our patients' (lines 112-113) (Rapley et al., 2011). In 
addition, there is a subtle biologisation of the patients themselves through the use of 
medical terms such as 'relapse' and 'illness' (lines 114, 120). These traditional 
medical terms take-for-granted biology as causal, and therefore that the patient is 
constructed as helpless victim of pathology that may return at any moment, and are 
therefore not responsible for their own distress (Harper, 1996, 1999). Through 
expressions such as 'what you do with that' or 'whether you treat them' (lines 115-
116), professionals are constructed as making the decisions and possessing agency 
and the expert knowledge to treat the individual. However, interestingly the agency 
that a distressed person has in decisions around treatment or influencing housing 
matters, are not explored. It is possible that this represents the difficulty in integrating 
the individual/social opposition into aetiological models of psychosis which 
simultaneously construct the cause of 'psychosis' as biological and patients as 
passive, whilst suggesting there are ways distressed people can alter their social 
context to reduce relapse (Harper, 1996, 1999; Johnstone, 1993). Furthermore, the 
focus on effects ('relapse', line 114) of life experiences, directs the attention of 
professionals, and therefore interventions, on the 'illness' and away from the how 
and why people are subjected to the distress and suffering of abuse or assault, such 




3.2.4. Multi-factorial talk and the construction of the role of trauma in psychosis  
The previous extracts in this section have shown how discourses derived from 
biological, psychological and sociological narratives were variably drawn upon in the 
interviews whilst constructing the aetiology of psychosis in the context of a possible 
link with trauma. The following section presents an analysis of an extract in which 
biomedical, psychological and sociological theories are integrated in an attempt to 
construct a 'biopsychosocial' narrative of psychosis aetiology in the context of 
trauma. It demonstrates the difficulty faced by professionals in accommodating 
sometimes conflicting accounts of distress.  
Biopsychosocial or multi-factorial constructions have been shown to be commonly 
drawn upon in psychiatric services (Read et al., 2004). Such multi-factorial accounts 
of patient’s problems have been illustrated in analysis of GP's accounts of their 
patient’s difficulties and in psychiatrist’s accounts of 'paranoia' (Gabe & Lipshitz-
Phillips, 1984; Harper, 1999).  
Extract 11: 
 
Res: if someone had already received a diagnosis /Dr E: yes/ of say for, of 
a a psychotic /Dr E: yes/, on the schizophrenia, a psychosis or a 
schizophrenia /Dr E: so, yeah/ category, erm and they began to talk 
about, erm, a specific trauma that they had experienced /Dr E: yes/ in 
their life, would that influence how you would, first of all your diagnosis of 
them? And then maybe second of all how you approach that person, with 
treatment, etcetera? (344-352). 
 
Dr E:  I think, I think there isn’t the time in the system that we work in. Not 
so much in our team, but in gen, mainstream psychiatry /Res: uhuh/ there 
is, isn’t the time, the resources etcetera to, which is very sad for me to 
say, to, to explore that and to undo the problems and /Res: yeah/ so 
therefore it’s a repeating pattern that just gets reinforced and reinforced 
and then people /Res: uhuh/ are in the system for twenty years and then 
you can’t do anything about it /Res: mmm/, they are just institutionalised 
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(.). The first bit was the diagnosis wasn’t it? /Res: mmm/, I suppose this is 
where the medical model comes in again, erm I suppose the way I am 
trained to think about things is erm, actually it would be that that person 
had some genetic predisposition to developing a psychotic illness and the 
environment in some way perpet-precipitated that first episode /Res: right/ 
and that’s probably how I would formulate it /Res: okay/, rather than it 
being another diagnosis so much. This is where it‘s helpful to understand 
symptoms actually /Res: uhuh/ erm because I think if somebody has sort 
of a negative erm view of the world, negative cognitions about the world 
and they’ve been abused in their early life and their psychosis is also erm 
persecutory erm, it’s kind of more understandable isn’t it? If somebody 
feels persecuted and is having a psychotic breakdown, if they’ve been 
abused or there has been a lot of expressed emotion in the home in early 
life and there’s been very lots of criticism because, you know, Mum and 
Dad have, or just Mum or just Dad have been overly critical, actually their 
psychosis can be better understood, can’t it? In all, well I think I think it 
could be understood /Res: uhuh/. Erm, and I suppose that it’s a shame 
actually that we don’t spend the time thinking about the context in which 
those symptoms arise and we label them with a psychosis and not really 
fully understand the context in which they’ve experienced that, those 
symptoms (409-443). 
 
Here Dr E is responding to a question regarding the influence of the disclosure of 
trauma upon diagnosis and treatment. This account is extremely complex in its 
acknowledgement of trauma, in this case abuse in early life, and its relationship with 
psychotic experiences. Throughout the narrative there are several qualifications 
offered, including 'I suppose' (lines 419, 420, 439), 'probably' (line 420), 'I think' (lines 
409, 427), and 'kind of' (line 431). The effect of these qualifications is the introduction 
of ambiguity and tentativeness (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Harper (1999) describes 
how such qualifications within professional accounts can act as a 'useful defence', as 
only tentative hypotheses were being offered to describe the influence of trauma in 
the aetiology of a person distress diagnosed with 'psychosis'.  In addition, it allows 




The account given by Dr E draws upon a wide range of theoretical frameworks: 
sociological (e.g. 'environment' line 423), biological psychiatry (e.g. 'psychotic illness' 
line 422), cognitive (e.g. 'negative cognitions' line 429), attachment (e.g. 'expressed 
emotion' line 434), contextual or systemic (e.g. 'been abused' line 430) and 
behavioural (e.g. 'overly critical' line 437). In doing so, if one aspect were to be 
challenged, for example the evidence for a link between early life experience of 
abuse and a negative or persecutory view of the world, then the other candidates 
could be employed to explain the role of trauma in the aetiology of psychosis. 
Furthermore, the acknowledgement of multiple interacting frameworks gives the 
appearance of open-mindedness to - and an integration of - the various theories, 
thus constructing the speaker as a thoughtful and liberal professional. However, at 
the same time, by presenting them in a hierarchical fashion, with biology being 
placed as at the core, namely 'genetic predisposition' (line 421), the other factors - 
such as, abuse or attachment - are positioned as having an effect upon how, as 
opposed to interacting with, the assumed biological dysfunction manifests itself 
through symptoms (Harper, 1999). By drawing upon a biopsychosocial or multi-
factorial narrative, Dr E's account utilises rhetoric of balance and a liberal 
assumptions that all aspects have some utility, whilst allowing current contested 
practices such as diagnosis, to be maintained through relativizing challenges (Billig, 
1987; Boyle, 2011). 
 
Initially Dr E positions themselves at a professional and institutional level as being 
required or obligated to work within a particular theoretical framework, namely the 
'medical model', of understanding aetiology and the associated language in relation 
to 'psychotic illness' (line 419). Here it appears that an empiricist repertoire provides 
a framework to talk about 'psychopathology' and diagnosis (e.g. 'psychotic illness' 
and 'psychosis' lines 422 & 430), in a way that stresses an objective and impersonal 
approach, thus maintaining the scientific legitimacy Dr E's comments (Harper, 1994; 
Craven & Coyle, 2007; Georgaca, 2013). Simultaneously, Dr E redirects the 
diagnostic account to one where personal (e.g. 'it’s kind of more understandable isn’t 
it? If somebody feels persecuted and is having a psychotic breakdown', lines 431-
433) and contextual factors (e.g. abuse, lines 430 & 433) are drawn upon to 
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understand a person's 'symptoms' (line 441), as such creating an account of a 
'diagnosis' that is better 'understood' in relation to the persons context (line 438). 
This example of a 'contingent account' constructs the diagnosis of psychosis as 
influenced by a number of subjective factors, and recognises the professionals own 
investment and orientation to diagnosis (Harper, 1995). In drawing upon this 
repertoire, the psychiatrist appears to be acknowledging their subjectivity and 
personal agency in the diagnostic process as enhancing the process saying 'actually 
their psychosis could be better understood' (lines 437-438) (Harper, 1995). Thus, the 
use here of a contingent discourse could be viewed as serving to resist and 
undermine the taken-for-granted objectivity and impersonal nature of the 'psychiatric 
professional', a view which is perpetuated through an empiricist discourse (Harper, 
1995; Craven & Coyle, 2007). 
 
Interestingly, this contingent account is accompanied by an expression of regret at 
the lack of focus upon the adverse life experiences that may link to a person's 
distress when Dr E states, 'I suppose that it’s a shame actually that we don’t spend 
the time thinking about the context' (lines 439-441). This perhaps represents a 
dilemma faced by Dr E of acknowledging life experiences as contributing to a 
diagnosis within a mental health context where an empiricist discourse and the 
apparatus of diagnosis is institutionally dominant (Coyle, 2007). However by doing 
so, the speaker appears to be downplaying the authority of their expert position and 
agency, whilst in effect distancing her from such decisions. Again, it is possible this 
ambivalence represents the difficulty in integrating the assumptions of oppositional 
individual/social discourses into aetiological formulations of psychosis in the context 
of traumatic life experiences. On one hand Dr E's description is a biomedical 
account, whereby the patient is constructed as a passive sufferer of a (presumed) 
biochemical imbalance, and where a diagnostic categorisation is utilised as a basis 
for informing medical intervention. On the other hand, Dr E attempts to integrate a 
social account, which constructs the patient as an active agent with beliefs derived 
through experience, and thereby locates their problems in the context of personal 
and social circumstances. Correspondingly, such an account is linked to a 




3.3. Strategies to Support a Biological Model of Psychosis Aetiology in the 
Context of the Challenge of Trauma 
 
The previous sections have an analysis of some of the ways in which the language 
and representation of the relationship between 'trauma' and 'psychosis' may operate 
in constructing particular versions as reasonable and plausible (Boyle, 2002a; 
Harper, 1996).  
 
Several authors have suggested that a threat is posed to psychiatry by evidence that 
both the form and content of emotional distress and 'disordered' behaviour - 
including experiences of trauma - are systematically, meaningfully and inseparably 
related to social context and life experience (Boyle, 2011, pg 35; Johnstone, 2011; 
Harper, 1999). Arguably, such threat is often managed through the deployment of 
common discursive resources which support a biomedical aetiological model of 
psychosis (Boyle, 2002b, 2011). This section will examine some of the specific 
rhetorical strategies used during the interviews in response to the possible challenge 
that is posed to the disease/illness model of psychosis by the role of trauma. 
3.3.1. The equivalence of psychosis and psychiatric illness: the use of the medical 
metaphor. 
In the accounts, equating the equivalence of the psychiatric diagnosis of psychosis 
with diagnosis in general medicine allowed the status of a person's experience of 
distress to be more easily conceptualised as biomedical (Stevens & Harper, 2007). 
Extract 12: 
Res: Do you see then as trauma being different, playing different roles in 
each of them [Schizophrenia and PTSD] or, erm? 
Dr F: No I think the role trauma plays is probably similar, but the illness is 
what’s different /Res: right/ so the diagnosis, treatment and outcome of 
schizophrenia would be quite different obviously to depression or P_, 
PTSD, so the different pathways, totally different emphasis on medication 
perhaps someone with depression after PTSD may not need medication 
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at all /Res: mmm mmm/ they’d just need maybe the right kind of 
psychological therapy. Whereas with schizophrenia you’re probably going 
to want to give them medication as a core part of the treatment /Res: 
mmm mmm/ you know not the only thing, but certainly it would be /Res: 
yea/ a large part of it. So, in a way it’s like any illness, you know, the 
treatment of say, I don’t know, an ulcer is going to be different the 
treatment of erm, an overactive thyroid /Res: mmm mmm/ so it’s a bit 
similar in psychiatry, particularly for conditions that are different. 
Schizophrenia and PTSD are, or depression (873-885). 
In this extract, the psychiatrist compares differences between 'PTSD', 'Depression' 
and 'Schizophrenia' to differences between an 'ulcer', and an 'overactive thyroid' 
(lines 875 - 882). By using such an analogy, several rhetorical functions can be 
performed. First, this comparison constructs mental health diagnoses as real medical 
conditions, i.e. as illnesses. This construction not only legitimizes these forms of 
human distress, but also the need for medical intervention such as 'medication as a 
core part of treatment' (line 879) (Stevens & Harper, 2007). Furthermore, this 
analogy draws upon an evolutionary discourse that constructs mental disorders as 
something that is of/in the body that is failing to perform as it was designed to do so 
(Wakefield 1999, Boyle, 2002a). Since dysfunction has been inferred, modification is 
legitimated through treatment with 'medication' or 'psychological therapy' (lines 877, 
878). Throughout, qualifications are offered - such as 'you're probably' and 'part of' - 
which have the effect of introducing tentativeness to the treatment formulation, 
allowing the psychiatrist to argue, if questioned, that they are not rejecting 
psychological approaches for psychotic experiences. 
Key to this discursive device is the comparison that the 'treatment', 'diagnosis' and 
'outcome' of 'Schizophrenia' as being 'quite different obviously to depression or P, 
PTSD' (lines 874-875), with the treatment of physical health problems, saying 
'illness, you know, the treatment of say, I don’t know, an ulcer is going to be different 
the treatment of erm, an overactive thyroid' (lines 881-882) In doing so there is an 
implication that assumptions of physical medicine can be applied to psychiatry. In 
this case a key assumption being the need to make a differential diagnosis in order 
to determine the correct treatment. Therefore, the use of this analogy implies that 
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there is a clear way of making a differential diagnosis between 'schizophrenia', 
'depression' and 'PTSD', as there is for an 'ulcer' and an 'overactive thyroid', one that 
relies upon an objective test as in physical medicine, for instance the measuring a 
physical marker such as direct observation of an ulcer, or measuring thyroxin levels 
in the blood (Boyle, 2002a). However, in psychiatry there are no pathognomic signs 
or symptoms by which to objectively verify diagnoses as 'schizophrenia' (Cape et al., 
1994). Instead, behaviour is observed and it is assumed that certain types of pattern 
will be found which correlate to a diagnostic construct (Boyle, 2002a). Furthermore, 
by equating of mental and physical illness, a medical pathology framework is 
invoked, which views the distressed individual as acted upon by impersonal forces, 
and is therefore incompatible with an agential framework which views that individual 
as a protagonist in a their life story (Jacobs & Cohen, 2010), It is possible the use of 
this analogy in the accounts links to a wider discourse of professional identity and 
reflects the importance to the status of psychiatry as a profession or scientific 
discipline to be seen to adhere to similar principle of physical medicine (Boyle, 
2002a). 
In relation to 'schizophrenia', the psychiatrist uses the sentence, 'you’re probably 
going to want to give them medication as a core part of the treatment' (line 880), 
which implies a number of subject positions including: doctor, patient, treatment and 
cure (Harper, 1996). This phrase sets up this treatment decision as consensual, non-
contested and as the taken-for-granted approach. In this extract, such an approach 
to treatment has been made to seem reasonable by constructing a 'schizophrenia' 
object as both publicly and professionally accepted through the everyday language 
of medicine, and as analogous to physical health problems. Therefore, if certain 
behaviours are symptoms of schizophrenia, then schizophrenia must lie behind them 
and then must in some sense 'exist', and if it can be treated, it must in some sense 
be capable of modification presumably through medication (Boyle, 2002a, p. 211). 
However, the assertion of the equivalence of psychiatric and medical illness ignores 
the power of psychiatrists to use psychiatric treatments coercively with the attendant 





3.3.2. The technical and flexible use of aetiology 
A second discursive resource noticed in the accounts was the flexible use of 
aetiology to preserve the biomedical assumptions of 'schizophrenia', whilst providing 
a space to acknowledge trauma in relation to psychosis. This spectrum was used in 
various ways in order to delineate psychotic presentations that were 'more or less' 
trauma related.  
In this extract, the psychiatrist provides a rationale for decontextualizing emotional 
distress in one diagnosis but not in another. In one instance discussing emotional 
distress in terms of a person's trauma history, in another instance rejecting the 
relevance of the person's trauma history and instead advancing an explanation 
based upon existing pathology (Jacobs & Cohen 2010). 
Extract 13: 
Res: Would you, is that because, I guess is there, is there, different 
aetiological models at play there /Dr G: mmm/, that for something that has 
symptoms that look like schizophrenia, that that have got someone that 
diagnosis, is that considered aetiologically different /Dr G: mmm/, than 
someone who has what might be considered psychotic symptoms, but 
they look very close to a trauma that you can identify, that it’s, that they’ve 
either disclosed or identified, are there two, are they considered to be 
very, two, different aetiologically, two different things? 
Dr G: Yes, yeah, I would say so, erm, suppose someone has first rank 
symptoms /Res: uhuh/, yeah, er like thought broadcast /Res: yeah/, 
people can read my mind or people are taking away my thoughts /Res: 
uhuh/, they are making me do this, erm and if you have certainly 
established those symptoms, I wouldn’t have a hesitation in saying look 
they have schizophrenia, but that does not mean that they do not have 
significant trauma, they might still do, but aetiologically in my mind they 
are different to people whose symptomatology reflects the trauma,/Res: 
uhuh/, in a way it’s a kind of neurotic psychotic spectrum ,where they’re 
more in touch with their trauma, whereas in the psychosis they are totally, 
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you know, the content may reflect in some people , but at least its more 
enclosed and in touch with the trauma, and in other people it’s totally 
displaced, it’s totally taken over by something else (448-474). 
Here, in response to a question regarding the use of different aetiological models, 
the psychiatrist draws upon a spectrum of aetiology based upon how much a 
person's symptoms 'reflects the trauma' (line 468). This spectrum positions a pure 
pathological biological disease state at one extreme pole, namely 'schizophrenia' or 
'psychosis' (lines 467, 470), and pure pathological psychological state at the 
opposing extreme, namely 'neurotic' (line 469). The psychiatrist first presents a 
number of phenomena in a four part list, including: ' thought broadcast', 'people can 
read my mind', 'people are taking away my thoughts', and 'they are making me do 
this' (lines 460-463). Such lists have been noted to have a powerful rhetorical 
function when constructing factual accounts, in this case the constructing of 
'schizophrenia' as an apparently objective diagnosis through presenting a list of 
symptoms (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  
In this narrative the psychiatrist draws upon a biomedical discourse; first by 
describing examples of a person's experience, such as 'people can read my mind' or 
'taking away my thoughts' (lines 461-462),  as symptoms, in this case  'first rank 
symptoms', from which a diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ is inferred (line 460). In doing 
so, this narrative constructs the impression that these observable phenomena are 
the indicators of a pathology that exists within the individual, this may represent what 
the psychiatrist refers to as 'something else' (line 474) (Harper, 1996, 1999). 
Therefore through reference to 'first rank symptoms', this construction gives agency 
to the individual pathology, and positions contextual influences as non-agentive, and 
provides a rationale for decontextualising emotional distress. 
Simultaneously, this apparently 'taken for granted' construction of an archetypal 
biological disorder, namely 'schizophrenia'(line 465), is deployed alongside a 
narrative that draws upon psychoanalytic theory to construct a 'psychosis' where 
trauma occupies a causal position and is positioned at a 'neurotic psychotic' pole of a 
spectrum (line 469) (Boyle, 2002a, Johnstone, 2011). This construction appears to 
have several effects; first, the challenge posed by trauma to the concept of 
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schizophrenia representing a primarily biological illness can be inoculated by a shift 
to a trauma related psychosis, here by stating 'aetiologically in my mind they are 
different' (lines 466-467). Second, a challenge to the biomedical assumptions of 
schizophrenia that is posed by obvious trauma content, namely 'symptomotology 
reflects the trauma' (line 468), is met by a move to a ‘neurosis’ (line 469) and 
therefore a psychoanalytic model. This appears to represent antagonistic agential 
frameworks regarding the role of trauma in this extract. An effect of invoking an 
individual pathological framework is that interest shifts from story to mechanism. So 
when 'schizophrenia' pathology is referred to, the person has become distressed 
because of impersonal causal processes, in this case 'first rank symptoms' (line 
460), therefore their experience of trauma is irrelevant. In the second agential 
framework the person is distressed because of something, namely 'trauma', 
therefore their 'symptomatology' and 'neurosis' is influenced by their story (Jacobs & 
Cohen, 2010). However, even with this apparent shift in aetiological models  there is 
no challenge to the normal/pathological and individual/social oppositions, given that 
the content is still seen as within the individual and representative of a pathological 
state given they are viewed as 'neurotic' (line 469) (Harper, 1999).  
3.4. The Construction of the Role of Psychiatry and the Effects on the 
Treatment of People Labelled 'Psychotic' in the Context of Trauma 
 
The previous sections have explored how when constructing the role of trauma 
through discursive resources derived primarily from biomedical discourse, a picture 
of trauma's relationship with psychosis contains certain assumptions, expectations 
and legitimates practices and subject positions (Harper, 1996, 1999).This section 
considers the influences on the practice of psychiatrists constructions of the role of 
trauma in relation to psychosis that were explored in the previous sections. There is 
a focus upon the analysis of the interviews in the context of wider cultural and 
professional culture, with a central theme being the forms of intervention carried out 





There were two dominant forms of professional intervention or response to 
experiences of trauma by the people using psychiatric services for experiences 
labelled as psychosis. These involved risk management and the provision of 
diagnosis and treatment. 
 
3.4.1. The professional alignment with medicine as defining treatment approaches  
 
A variation of discourse that privileged medication in the practices of psychiatry with 
people with a diagnosis of psychosis in the context of trauma draws upon the 
discourse of professional alignment with medicine. Here the psychiatrist is positioned 
at a professional and institutional level as being required or obligated to work within a 
particular professional framework of understanding and associated vocabulary, one 
which generally accepts empiricist discourse, and the apparatus of diagnosis and 
treatment (Coyle, 2007). 
 
Extract 14: 
Res: I’m thinking about the things that might influence you’re the way you 
might see things [aetiology], as opposed to say for instance, the other 
professional, who might be more likely to, might do like you say to er re-
diagnose someone as personality disorder, or having a, has personality, 
as having a label of personality /Dr G: trauma related/, what’s been most 
influential on kind of, maybe, the way that you? (514-520). 
Dr G: I have a medical background, one of the treatments I give is 
medication /Res: uhuh/, yeah, so say if I was psychologist, it doesn’t 
matter to me whether this person has schizophrenia, whether this person 
has personality disorder or it really doesn’t matter, what I’m doing is 
looking at all the influential factors that’s affecting their behaviour, /Res: 
uhuh/ their experience, and erm their affect, you know if you take away 
CBT type model or even psychodynamically, which is looking at 
understanding the person based on their experiences, etcetera etcetera, 
so why does it matter if it is psychosis or personality, why should it matter 
/Res: mmm/, so it allows you to be more broad /Res: mmm/ in your 
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thinking and give equal weightage to all your patients /Res: mmm/, but 
unfortunately or fortunately my profession is different, so I have to use 
medication /Res: mmm/ so if I believe, and this is my experience as well 
(524-540). 
In this account, the psychiatrist is responding to a question regarding influences 
upon their diagnostic decisions. Dr G constructs a narrative of the obviousness of a 
professional affiliation with medicine, and the available interventions, as mediating 
their practices towards people with psychotic experiences in the context of trauma. 
Throughout the psychiatrist attempts to navigate both medical/pharmaceutical and 
psychological therapies narratives (Harper, 1996, 1999). In doing so they are 
negotiating narratives that are interested in different phenomena, one that produces 
biochemical effects (medication, line 525 ), and one that focuses upon the meaning 
of life experiences, presumably through a focus on behaviours and beliefs  (CBT or 
Psychodynamic therapy, lines 531-532). Therefore, this account  present a 
thoughtful liberal view of various ways of formulating psychosis and its relationship to 
trauma, but positions psychiatrists as constrained to a biomedical formulation by 
their professional alignment with the traditional approaches of medicine. A similar 
narrative was seen in other interviews e.g. Dr B, lines 519-539.  
The psychiatrist starts out by adopting a 'one down' position with the phrase 'if I was 
a psychologist, it doesn't matter to me whether this person has schizophrenia, 
whether this person has personality disorder' (lines 526-528), again in doing so 
constructing the speaker as thoughtful and open minded. Through this statement a 
psychologist is constructed as a subject who is not constrained by diagnostic 
categorization, and thus is allowed greater freedom and agency to explore a patient's 
life experiences and context. The psychiatrist goes on to give the impression of this 
being a beneficial, or positive, feature of a psychologists role by saying, 'so it allows 
you to be more broad in your thinking and give equal weightage to all your patients' 
(lines 535-537). This 'diagnostic free' subject is contrasted with a subject who is 
professionally from a 'medical background' and is implicitly constructed as having  to 
rely upon diagnosis as a means to justify the administration of medication, 'but 
unfortunately or fortunately my profession is different, so I have to use medication' 
(lines 537-539). Therefore, here agency is given to a diagnostic object (e.g. 
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'schizophrenia') which represents an illness with internal pathology that necessitates 
a chemical approach, specifically 'medication' (line 539). This assertion that a 
diagnostic category is an indicator for professional intervention renders a survivor of 
experiences of trauma as a 'damaged, helpless person' who is in need of medical or 
psychological technology to facilitate their return to 'normality' (Patel, 2011, p.430). 
Additionally, this account warrants the continued use of medication as the primary 
method of treatment and the position of psychiatry as the administering 
professionals, with psychology being positioned as independent of diagnosis and 
occupying the primary position in exploring the content of peoples distress, and 
therefore the life experiences that may be categorised as traumatic. This may 
represent an influence of the multidisciplinary professional approach currently 
advocated in modern mental health services (NICE, 2010). 
As noted above, by explicitly constructing a definition of the role of a psychologist, Dr 
G implicitly constructs a definition of medicine indirectly saying ''my profession is 
different' (line 538). It is possible that such an implicit construction allows more 
flexibility to challenges, particularly given the highly contested topic of the role of 
trauma in the aetiology of psychosis. Following this implicit definition of medicine, Dr 
G shifts from saying the 'one of the treatments I give is medication'; to a statement 
that implies the use of medication appear inevitable, by saying 'so I have to use 
medication' (lines 524 & 538). This shift in treatment decision does not appear to be 
linked to the needs of the person, but rather identity claims about their discipline, one 
that appears to be bound up with legitimating the use of diagnostic categories 
(Boyle, 2011).   
By referencing the varying approaches taken by medicine and psychology, the 
speaker illustrates how different subject positions allow different actions (Willig, 
2008). They implicitly construct how their position as professional adherent to a 
biomedical framework, and the associated need to diagnose, as a 'technology of 
power' which limits exploration of life experiences upon distress, saying 'so it allows 
you to be more broad in your thinking' (line 535) (Foucault, 1988). In contrast, by 
drawing upon cognitive behavioural or psychodynamic narratives that warrant non-
pharmaceutical alternatives and are not limited by diagnosis, saying 'whether this 
person has personality disorder or, it really doesn't matter' (line 527), they position 
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'psychologists' as the 'experts' to explore a person's adverse life experiences. One 
effect of this account is that it allows space for social and psychological 
interventions, perhaps representing the rise in cognitive behavioural therapies and 
the increasing involvement in clinical psychology in the treatment of psychosis 
(NICE, 2010). However, by creating a distinction between psychiatry and 
psychology, with regards to diagnosis and medication, a professional identity is 
constructed which places these skills firmly in the expertise of psychiatry. This may 
be associated with a wider discourse of professional identity and provides 'a powerful 
framework for mental health professionals to demonstrate the connection between 
science and practice' (Boyle, 2002a; Kirk and Kutchins, 1992, p. 23). Conversely, the 
work of psychology and therefore talking therapies is constructed as independent of 
diagnosis. This may represent a 'technology of power' governing how people are 
seen by mental health services as fragmented or separate biological, psychological 
and social beings, which is maintained by the division of professional approaches 
(Foucault, 1988). 
3.4.2. A primary role of psychiatry being the modification of psychosis through 
medication  
A theme in the accounts was the taken-for-grantedness of medication as the primary 
treatment option, a similar construction has been highlighted by Harper (1999). 
Constructing the problem of psychosis at a biomedical level, constrained the types of 
intervention provided by psychiatrists to those of chemical management of distress, 
and limited the acknowledgement of trauma (Harper, 2007).  In this case, the viability 
of medication as the only treatment served to position a person's experience of 
trauma as having little influence in the early stages of the treatment offered. 
Extract 7:   
Res: Does that [Possibility that a person may not have reported or been 
asked about trauma] become a problem when you think about that 
actually you may have erm, kind of that you may have people who go 
through and are being treated in particular way and actually may be other 
treatments, because it sounds like perhaps a number of treatment paths 
for people, even though they're given [diagnosis of psychosis]? 
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Dr B: It will be, it will be, I think the, the will still have you know guidelines 
which we're expected to follow, so I think the thoughts will be slightly 
different but the mainstream of treatment will be still the same so 
everyone every psychotic patient will get an antipsychotic, the question is 
what antipsychotic we will choose and er and er because they all have 
slightly different psychod, sorry pharmacodynamic profile and er, er 
whether we are keen to think about an antidepressant on top of it or mood 
stabiliser, things like that so erm_but that but also people who have 
psychosis they will get antipsychotic if they if they are truly psychotic, 
whether it is trauma related or not. (481-496) 
 
In this extract, the psychiatrist is responding to a question regarding treatment 
pathways for people who receive a diagnosis of psychosis in the context of trauma. 
Dr B positions psychopathology, in this case 'psychosis', over the context and 
content of a person’s experience during initial treatment decisions, and indicate that 
their position taken toward the individual is governed by, 'guidelines which we're 
expected to follow' (line 487) (Foucault, 1988). The psychiatrist constructs a patients 
trauma experiences as possibly influencing their psychotic experiences, however 
that the primary treatment response should be that of medication 'whether trauma 
related or not' (line 496). An interesting linguistic feature of this extract, is the 
repeated use of 'will' (lines 486, 488, 489, 490, 494), this use of the future tense has 
the effect of rendering the administration of antipsychotic medication as agentless 
and inevitable, and therefore means the psychiatrist does not have to take 
responsibility or make strong concrete claims about the process (Edwards & Potter, 
1992).  
 
A key feature of this extract is how Dr B alternates between two competing 
discursive repertoires whilst constructing their approach to diagnosis and treatment. 
Throughout, a sense of 'objectivity' is made intelligible through the use of an 
'empiricist' discourse which operates in dualistic terms by creating a separation 
between the subject (e.g. 'patient') and object (e.g. psychosis) (Craven & Coyle, 
2007; Gilbert & Mulkay,1984). This duality is evident in the extract where Dr B says, 
'every psychotic patient', and 'people who have psychosis' and  'truly psychotic', thus 
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invoking a diagnostic category as if a pre-existing entity is lying inside the sufferer 
(lines 489, 496, 495) (Georgaca, 2013). In contrast, a 'contingent' repertoire is drawn 
upon which constructs the selection of treatment as  a process during which 
psychiatrists - as a professional collective - are active agents, and this is reflected by 
the statements: 'what antipsychotic we will choose' and 'we are keen to think about' 
(lines 490, 492). Here, the use of "we" possibly functions to manage the 
accountability of the speaker's views by providing a line of insulation against any 
criticism that personal interest or individual subjectivity play a role in the treatment 
decision. However, the notion of 'choice' here could be considered based upon 
factors that are not entirely 'impersonal' and 'objective' and therefore inconsistent 
with an empiricist discourse, such judgement involves the acknowledging of power in 
determining treatment course via less than objective and neutral judgements (Boyle, 
2002a, p. 227). Dr B then invokes a 'technical' repertoire, which is closely related to 
an empiricist discourse, saying central to the treatment decision is 
'pharmacodynamic profile' of the 'antipsychotic' and whether 'antidepressant' or 
'mood stabilising' medications are required (lines 492-493) (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). 
Additionally, they further go on to emphasise a sense of objectivity in the treatment 
process by downplaying the influence of the patients individual experiences, by 
saying 'whether it is trauma related or not' (line 495). The effect of using this highly 
specialised language is to create an impression that medication choices are based 
upon rational problem solving techniques (Boyle, 2002a). Furthermore, by locating 
the entire formulation in a discourse of professional responsibility as governed by 
external and abstract structures, namely 'guidelines' and talk of 'mainstream 
treatment' (lines 487-488), a sense of objectivity is further reinforced as subjectivity is 
governed by these institutional apparatus of power which oversee the practices of 
the psychiatrist (Foucault, 1988). 
 
Despite the opposing natures of these discursive repertoires, the effect of this 
psychiatric formulation is to construct the nature of the treatment decision as based 
upon certain 'objective' factors and a neutral stance when making treatment 
decisions by talking about decontextualised 'things' rather than contextualised 
people. It is driven by the biomedical taken-for-granted assumption of the existence 
of a pre-existing entity, namely 'psychosis', and leads to the positioning of the 
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patients experience of trauma, as not influencing this stage of treatment. Such a 
construction is consistent with a biomedical understanding of psychotic experiences 
as meaningless symptoms of an underlying mental illness (Boyle, 2011, Georgaca, 
2013). It seems that the production of empiricist accounts enables professionals to 
retain their scientific credentials and avoid appearing as if human interest influences 
diagnostic or treatment judgements, such formulations may link to a wider cultural 
discourse that represent a fear of being seen as agents of social control (Georgaca, 
2013; Boyle, 2002a).Whilst it has been noted that contingent elements of accounts 
can allow an appeal to personal contextual factors in order to explain elements of 



















CHAPTER 4 - DISCUSSION 
4.1 Study Aims Revisited 
The aim of this study was to explore how the relationship between 'trauma' and 
'psychosis' is constructed in and through psychiatrists talk, and to identify the 
material and social practices enabled through these constructions (Willig, 2008; 
Harper, 1999). The main research questions were warranted by the lack of 
contextualised psychiatrist accounts regarding the link between trauma and 
psychosis, despite the ever increasing evidence of high rates of childhood sexual 
and physical abuse in people who have received diagnoses of psychosis 
(Johnstone, 2011; Read, 2004). 
The primary research aim was addressed by presenting a reading of psychiatrists' 
accounts whilst they explored the link between experiences of trauma and 
psychosis. It was apparent that medical discourses of diagnosis and classification, 
and the associated biomedical assumptions, were drawn upon during descriptions of 
both the concepts of psychosis as well as trauma. Despite the increasing common 
use of the term 'trauma' among professionals, its ambiguous use, and lack of clarity 
in this study failed to convey the complexity of the many adverse experiences that 
have been linked to the distress labelled as 'psychosis' (Johnstone, 2011; Read et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, descriptions relying upon the technology of psychiatric 
classification privileged assumptions of individualism and internal pathology, 
consequently functioning to limit the potential influence of the trauma discourse on 
the contextualising of peoples distress, and by positioning the individual as 
'damaged' led to little acknowledgment of the perpetrators of abuses (Patel, 2003; 
2011; Johnstone, 2011). The variability in the constructions of the terms 'trauma' and 
'psychosis' were consistent with those suggested during a review by Boyle (2006), 
who suggests they enable the systematic avoidance of acknowledging life 
experiences in peoples distress, therefore having implications for research, 
aetiological models, and practices relying upon these categories.    
Throughout the interviews the categories of psychosis, and in particular 
schizophrenia, were often presented uncritically as 'brain disorders' (Boyle, 2002b; 
Read et al., 2004). Such constructions positioned biogenetic factors as dominant in 
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the aetiology of a person's distress, and by implication positioned psychosocial 
factors as symptoms or consequences of these illnesses (Pilgrim, 2002). This finding 
is consistent with findings presented in the attitudes literature which indicate a 
biologically based aetiological model of schizophrenia was most strongly endorsed 
by psychiatrists (Harland et al., 2009; Cape et al., 1994; Magliano et al., 2010). A 
common feature of this biomedical construction was the dominance of a vocabulary 
of meaningless symptoms, individual vulnerabilities, and reliance upon context-lite 
language such as 'trauma'. This had the general effect of minimising the importance 
of a person's context and life experiences upon the distress and problems 
categorised as psychoses (Boyle, 2002a, 2011). Furthermore, the constructing of 
diagnoses of psychosis through the language of medical pathology frameworks, 
such as employed by the DSM, led to incompatibility with a view of a person's 
distress as meaningful and understandable in the context of their lives (Jacobs & 
Cohen, 2010). Despite the lack of available mainstream empirical evidence for these 
aetiological positions, their plausibility and factuality was maintained by a variety of 
'scientific' empiricist discourses, such as reference to neurotransmitters (Boyle, 
2002a, 2002b; Bentall, 2003).  
The research question was also addressed by exploring how biopsychosocial 
aetiological models were variably drawn upon to construct the relationship between 
trauma and psychosis. The use of this discursive repertoire appears consistent with 
suggestions that the biopsychosocial model, along with synonyms such as 
'vulnerability-stress' and 'diathesis-stress', are commonly drawn upon in psychiatric 
services (Read et al., 2004). Additionally that through multi-factorial accounts, 
psychosocial factors - including experiences of trauma - were incorporated into what 
in essence was a biomedical model (Dillon et al., 2012; Pilgrim, 2002; Harper, 1999). 
These constructions were inter-penetrated by social practices and 'technologies of 
institutional power', and determined the kinds of objects (e.g. trauma as a trigger) 
and subjects (e.g. psychotic) which were constructed (Foucault, 1982; Harper, 1996, 
1999). Thus supporting suggestions that the reification of biomedical aetiology has 
led to the dominance of this way-of-seeing aetiology amongst psychiatric 
professionals (Georgaca, 2013; Harper, 2013).   
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Of particular interest to the aims of this study was the apparent influence of the 
disclosure of traumatic experiences upon the discourse of diagnosis drawn upon by 
the psychiatrists and, by implication, the services and approaches to treatment a 
patient would receive. It was noticed that, if to the 'expert' listener the content of 
'symptoms' were identifiable as 'reflecting' adverse experiences of trauma, distress 
was perceived as aetiologically psychological or as a psychological trigger to a 
biological illness. Furthermore, certain diagnoses were viewed as compatible with an 
agential framework such as, personality disorder, or a neurotic disorder, and 
therefore necessitated psychological intervention (Jacobs & Cohen, 2010). In 
contrast, if the content of a person's experiences of distress to the listener was 
considered bizarre and not obviously linked to past experiences of trauma or abuse, 
it was likely to be perceived as aetiologically biomedical (Boyle, 2002a). This 
highlights how psychiatrists attempts to acknowledge interpersonal or social factors 
in distress  by drawing upon the empiricist and rationalist paradigms offered by 
psychiatric diagnosis, privileges individual pathological explanations and therefore 
maintain the individual-social dualism (Georgaca, 2000; Harper, 1996).  
This possible influence of a psychiatrists interpretation of whether a person's 
'symptoms' are consistent with 'trauma', raises concerns given the  various 
suggestions that a person's recounting of the experiences may be extremely 
contradictory, highly emotional and fragmented, which can often undermine their 
credibility (Herman, 1992). Furthermore, research has strongly implicated avoidance 
of recalling particular events, as well as, the role of dissociative experiences in 
leading to under reporting or misperception (Macfarlane 1995). Added to this, 
Georgaca (2000), in relation to the category of 'delusions', suggested that it is 
debatable whether a clear distinction between plausibility or implausibility, truth or 
falsity, of subjective statements can be sustained and in terms of clinical practice and 
questions the capacity of clinicians to make such judgments. Furthermore, such 
decisions appear contingent upon a variety of subjective variables, including the 
psychiatrist’s experience, training background and even age (Cape, 1994; Harland et 
al., 2009).  
The second research question was to identify the various subject positions enabled 
by these constructions, and to provide insights to the institutional practices acting on 
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psychiatrists in these services shaping responses to people diagnosed with 
psychosis who have experienced trauma.  
The accounts of treatment approaches to psychosis appeared to draw upon a range 
of unarticulated biomedical assumptions which functioned to construct those 
positioned as 'psychotic' as individually pathological, as opposed to experiencing 
distress as a reaction to traumatic events (Harper, 1996, 1999;). Consequently, a 
decontextualised individual was constructed as the target for interventions based 
upon the modification of internal biological pathology (Boyle, 2002a). This was 
consistent with Harper's (1994, 1996) accounts of treatment decisions, which drew 
on both contingent and empiricist discursive repertoires with competing effects.  
Whilst a contingent account allowed acknowledgement of contextual factors, a 
professional alignment with the technologies of medicine and therefore notions of 
impersonal, neutral and objective treatment decisions, favoured an empiricist 
discourse which allows retention of their scientific credentials (Georgaca, 2013).  
Several of the accounts constructed the reasonableness of psychosis as an illness 
modifiable through the practices of medicine. These included the use of medical 
metaphors to assert the equivalence of psychosis with medical pathology. Among 
the effects of such constructions was the legitimization of the management of 
apparently meaningless behavioural manifestations (or symptoms) through primarily 
chemical interventions, and the assessment of human distress by an 'expert' (Boyle, 
2002a; Jacobs & Cohen, 2010; Moncrieff, 2011). This is consistent with concerns 
that DSM through its many editions has redefined understandable reactions to life 
circumstances as 'illnesses', with these then becoming the target of a variety of 
medications (Johnstone, 2011). A key finding was how the use of the technology of 
diagnostic constructs had the effect of removing; meaning from a person's 
experience of distress; personal agency ('sick role'); the role of social context. This 
ultimately led to a diversion of professional attentions away from how and why 
people are subjected to the distress of abuse and/or neglect (Patel, 2011). 
Furthermore, this shifting of a person from an agentive person with problems to a 
position of being a passive victim of pathology, is consistent with research 
highlighting that the majority users of mental health services are not asked about 
sexual or physical abuse (Rose et al., 1991; Read et al., 2006). Additionally it 
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appears to reflect the concerns that diagnosis has a number of medical and social 
consequences, many of which can be viewed as damaging to a distressed person 
(Boyle, 2002a; Harper, 1996, 1999; Georgaca, 2013).  
In general the analyses sheds light on an apparent tension between social/individual 
and normal/pathological oppositions in the psychiatrists' constructions of the 
relationship between trauma and psychosis (Harper, 1999). This appeared to result 
in a difficulty in seeing an individual's distress as both embodied as well as 
simultaneously interlinked with society, and possibly represents the reification of 
models which privilege a somewhat decontextualised embodied understanding of 
distress with a reliance on a biological predisposition, such as the stress vulnerability 
model (Cromby et al., 2013). Furthermore, this study draws attention to the difficulty 
faced by psychiatrists due to a reliance on the medical framework employed by the 
DSM which focuses upon what happens to people based upon impersonal 
processes and mechanisms. Therefore, shifting any interest in a person's story to the 
'mechanism' by which their distress manifests, such as symptoms (Jacobs & Cohen, 
2010) 
By focusing on the way professionals talk, this study has highlighted the importance 
of language in constructing the relationship between trauma and psychosis and in 
determining the kinds of objects (e.g. biogenetic psychosis) and subjects (e.g. the 
psychotic individual) produced, as well as that language is an active agent in this 
process rather than being passive (Harper, 1999). This study represents an attempt 
to explore some of unarticulated cultural and institutional assumptions, such as 
certain implied oppositions, and to map the consequences they have for 
professionals and those with diagnoses of psychosis. It is clear that the current 
understandings surrounding psychosis and its relationship with trauma remain to be 
maintained via a powerful nexus interconnected by apparently reasonable 
arguments and the apparent benefits which these provide professionals and service 





4.2. Reflecting on the Study  
This section presents an evaluation and critique in terms of a range of areas 
including; the methodology adopted; the epistemology that informed this study; the 
research process; and usefulness.  
4.2.1. Epistemology and Methodology 
A critical realist social constructionist epistemological position was adopted in this 
study. As highlighted, there have been several criticisms of such a position. Mainly 
these have arisen from epistemologically relativist scholars (e.g. Potter, 1992) who 
argue: firstly, that the extra-discursive can be conceptualised as a discursive 
accomplishment (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007; Willig, 2008); secondly, that 
researchers working within a critical realism framework have no systematic method 
of distinguishing between the discursive and non-discursive, and are therefore open 
to the influence of the researchers political inclinations (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007).  
In this study, the analysis endeavored to develop an account of how embodied, 
material, and institutional factors influenced psychiatrist's deployment of particular 
discursive constructions (e.g. a professional association with the institution of 
medicine). Furthermore, the analysis involved an exploration of how these extra-
discursive factors imposed constraints or made available accounts to psychiatrists, 
and therefore had implications for how they constructed the relationship between 
trauma and psychosis (e.g. a need to provide antipsychotic medication treatment) 
(Sims-Schouten et al., 2007; Willig, 1999, 2008).  
By attempting to combine realist and constructionist positions I experienced a pull 
between what have been described as incompatible positions (Speer, 2007). As a 
result, I feel I constructed an analysis weighed in favour of a constructionist level 
analysis. This was due, in part, to the influence of predominantly social 
constructionist accounts being available as to the effects of discursive constructions, 
such as psychiatric diagnostic categories. But perhaps more so due to the lack of 
clarity as to how, and to what extent, material reality may impact upon discourse - 
this led to a reluctance to articulating some of my analytic thoughts (Willig, 2008). 
This was particularly evident when the stage of the analytic process required me to 
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move beyond the text and to make inferences about 'the real world'. Therefore, I feel 
my application of discourse analysis perhaps fails to fully explore the influence of 
material reality upon psychiatrists accounts of the relationship between trauma and 
psychosis, in favour of an exploration of how the discursive constructions available to 
psychiatrists determined the kinds of objects (e.g. trauma as a trigger) and subjects 
(e.g. psychotic) that were constructed. 
Also of relevance here is how qualitative methods, such as the critical realist 
informed Foucauldian Discourse analysis undertaken in this study, have been 
criticised for being inconsistently applied, and for relying heavily on the interpretation 
of the researcher (Willig, 2008). This in some part may be due to the lack of precise 
methodological principles (Graham, 2005). I acknowledge that the focus of the 
discursive sites outlined in this piece of work are a product of my interpretation of the 
psychiatrist accounts captured during the interviews. Therefore, they are influenced 
by my position as a trainee psychologist with several years experience working in the 
area of 'psychosis', and are in line with my political motivation to produce an account 
that allows for a better representation of human diversity in contrast to the many 
normative positivist accounts (Harper, 1995). Given the lack of contextualised 
narratives of psychiatrist's talk whilst they explore the role of trauma in the distress of 
people who receive diagnoses of psychosis, as well as the dominance of positivist 
methodology in this area; I feel the opportunity to draw upon analytic principles in an 
'ad hoc' fashion allowed me to move beyond the constraints upon thought that result 
from rigid methodological rules (Graham, 2005). This has facilitated the meeting of 
the deconstructive aims of this study, and therefore has provided space for 
alternative understandings of how psychiatrists construct the relationship between 
trauma and psychosis (Willig, 1999).  
4.2.2. Evaluating the quality of the study 
Given the diverse positions held in regard to the processes and desirability of 
evaluating qualitative research,  I have turned to an evaluative process developed by 
Spencer and Ritchie (2012) which is based upon several recurring principles they 
believe are shared across many epistemological perspectives, and that underpin the 





This principle refers to the value and relevance of the evidence produced by this 
piece of work. Harper (1996) argues that the process of deconstruction in mental 
health can play a role in challenging taken-for-granted assumptions implied within 
clinical categories. Therefore, throughout this study, I have attempted to provide an 
in-depth understanding of the way by which extremely influential workers in mental 
health services, namely Psychiatrist's, construct the relationship between trauma and 
psychosis as well as the variety of ways which these discursive constructions 
facilitate and constrain opportunities for action. A particularly important contribution is 
the description of the processes by which service users experiences may become 
de-contextualised through biomedical discursive repertoires. For those positioned as 
'psychotic' this has implications for approaches to treatment and the meaning 
attributed to a person's experiences (Georgaca, 2013). For example, defining a 
person's distress as a disease-like diagnosis had the effect of positioning a person's 
context and life experience as non-agentic and facilitated the practice of obtaining 
treatment for a biomedical source (Jacobs & Cohen, 2010).  
Willig (2008) suggests that there are epistemological challenges to applying the 
findings from discourse analytic research, as well as whether findings can have 
relevance beyond the context of the study itself (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012). However 
despite the analysis being limited to a particular set of interactions occurring in a 
specific context, it can provide insights to how particular constructions are embedded 
in particular discursive repertoires. Therefore, by shedding light on these available 
discourses the analysis has wider significance to those involved with in and with 
mental health services. Furthermore, in conjunction with the increasing body of 
social constructionist informed research regarding professionals’ psychiatric 
practices such as, diagnosis, classification, and treatment, there are grounds for the 
generalisability of these findings (Georgaca, 2013).  Thus I will offer some 
implications for different interest groups in mental health including researchers, 
professionals and service users. These suggestions are consistent with the idea of 
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using discourse analysis to promote 'subversive discursive practices and spaces for 
resistance' (Willig, 1999, p12).    
4.2.2.2. Credibility  
Willig (2008) suggests that the association of discourse analysis with constructionist 
epistemology means that it would be inappropriate to evaluate this research based 
upon its correspondence to external conditions or contexts, such as whether it is 
corroborated by other research. This study is a discursive construction and therefore 
can only be evaluated in terms of its 'internal coherence, theoretical sophistication 
and persuasiveness' (Willig, 2008, p.156).   
Given that there are epistemological challenges to applying the findings from 
discourse analytic research, as well as whether findings can have relevance beyond 
the context of the study itself (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012), the principle of credibility 
adhered to here refers to the defensibility and plausibility of the claims made by this 
study (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012). 
In order to fulfil this criteria I have been transparent throughout as to the research 
process I have adhered to thus allowing the reader to assess the plausibility of the 
claims made. This is evidenced by: the explanation of the development of the study 
aims and a clear explanation of the analytic process followed (section 2.10); 
providing clear and comprehensive accounts of the labelling and categorizing of the 
phenomena focused upon during the analysis; by displaying extracts of the raw data 
from which the analysis was made (Willig, 2008) . Additionally, throughout the 
analytic process I met regularly with my research supervisor who scrutinised the 
analysis and questioned assumptions made about the data, particularly, when they 
appear to stray from the talk recorded in the transcripts.  
4.2.2.3. Rigour 
Spencer and Ritchie (2012) describe that this principle is concerned with 'the 
appropriateness of research decisions, the dependability of evidence and the 
general safe conduct of research' (pp. 231). In order to be make explicit my 
relationship with the study, a reflective diary was kept throughout, in which I was able 
document influences upon study decision (appendix 8). Also I have attempted to be 
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reflexive through continuous scrutiny of the study processes and my role throughout 
the study, this is considered in the reflexivity section of this chapter.  
I have endeavoured to declare any guiding values and the theoretical orientation 
adopted in this study, in particular the critical realist social constructionist 
epistemological stance. In addition, I have provided a description in section 2.10 of 
how the transcripts were analysed and provide a section of transcription including 
the coding as an example of the categorization process (appendices 7 & 9).   This 
allows the reader to take this into account when reviewing this study and any claims 
made as to what the transcripts represent (Willig, 2008). 
4.3. Reflexivity 
In contrast to positivist research, social constructionist informed research holds that 
subjectivity influences all forms of knowledge and therefore attempts should be 
made to recognise and account for such influences (Henwood & Parker, 1994). 
Therefore, here there is a consideration of the researcher’s contribution to the 
construction of meanings throughout the research (Willig, 2008). 
4.3.1. Data collection 
The controversial nature of the question being asked by this study appears to have 
had an influence upon the recruitment of willing psychiatrists.  A notable reason for 
psychiatrists declining to participate was scepticism as to the motivation of the 
researcher conducting the study, with several raising concern that the study may be 
an attempt by a 'Psychologist' to discredit the role of psychiatry in the area of 
psychosis. Such a concern may well have been compounded by the political context 
at the time of conducting the research, with the much anticipated release of the 
DSM-V nearing, there was increasing attention focused on what was being 
described as a 'turf war' between Psychiatry and Psychology. A further issue of 
collecting data via semi-structured interviews is one of the relationship between the 
interviewer and interviewee (Frith & Gleeson, 2012). In particular, the 'stake' and 
'interest' of both participants and the effect this had upon the data produced. (Potter 
& Hepburn, 2005, p.295). For instance, certain responses regarding diagnosis from 
the participants may have been a result of anticipated criticism from the interviewer 
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(a trainee psychologist who might be expected to have different views on diagnosis). 
Although claims of representativeness are not being made by this study, it is likely 
this limited the versions of the trauma and psychosis discourses mapped during this 
study. In addition, this may say something of the psychiatrists who agreed to take 
part in this research, such as their familiarity with the area.  
Harper and Thompson (2012) caution that interviews have become the preferred 
method of data collection this is despite a set of problems which are difficult to 
eliminate, such as issues of interest (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). It is suggested that 
such issues could be avoided through the use of alternative 'naturalistic' data 
collection methods such as, recording case discussions or reviewing case notes 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2005). The aim of using such data would be the avoidance of 
active researcher involvement and therefore the interactional issues associated with 
interviews. It is possible naturalistic records may have led to novel questions and 
issues arising that may otherwise have been limited by the interviewer's agenda. 
Furthermore, the audio or video recording of case discussions may have allowed 
consideration of questions, such as whether psychiatrists variably construct the 
relationship of psychosis with trauma when speaking with different professional 
groups. However, it should be noted that such methods pose the challenge of it 
being harder to explore research questions exhaustively due to a lack of direction 
from the researcher.  
4.3.2. Challenges of the analysis process 
A major difficulty faced was representing the interaction between the interviewer and 
interviewee in a way that prevented extracts being taken out of context. Often the 
extracts of particular interest to me were embedded in lengthy unfolding narratives, 
which commonly included  evolving monologues provided by the psychiatrists 
(obviously with some encouragement). In attempting to ensure the extracts are 
contextualised, I have included interactions and various interjections (Potter & 
Hepburn, 2005). In addition, I have attempted to orientate the reader to the context 
of the interview question by prefixing each analytic area with a brief explanation of 
what was being spoken about at the time.  However, given limitations on word count, 
I acknowledge that these steps may not allow the reader to make a full evaluation of 
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what was said independent of the one presented, which is strongly influenced by my 
own theoretical assumptions. 
During the interviews I held a dual position as both a researcher and a Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist who was, in many of the cases, working locally and so known 
to the Psychiatrists professionally. Therefore it weighed on my mind throughout the 
research how my interpretation of the words of the psychiatrists would be seen by 
those interviewed, many of whom I would likely work closely with in the future. I 
therefore felt a great responsibility to those who had taken part, as well as fear as to 
how my analysis might be perceived. Many authors have identified that ethical 
issues involved in interpreting the words of other. Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1997) 
highlight that researchers will have a preference for how the accounts are written 
with particular aims in mind. I have attempted to make these aims explicit throughout 
this research, whilst being mindful of my power relative to the interviewees to 
interpret their words. Furthermore, the aim of using a critical realist analysis informed 
by Foucauldian principles to interpret the psychiatrists' accounts was not an attempt 
to discover or map the 'true nature' of psychological phenomena or psychiatrists 
'minds'. Instead the aim was to explore the discursive worlds they inhabit as well as 
the social, psychological and physical effects of these discourses (Willig, 2008). This 
work itself represents a discursive construction and presents one of numerous 
possible interpretations of the accounts (Willig, 2008). As such, during the analysis it 
was important to remain mindful of the context of accounts as a product of an 
interview between a psychologist and psychiatrist, and how this research process 
has shaped the findings.  
Approaching the analysis with research questions and guiding concerns, although 
crucial, at times did not feel sufficient. This was compounded by being a researcher 
who was making the transition from only having previously conducted research from 
a quantitative and naive realist position. Key to this uncertainty was the absence of 
formal or 'objective' analytic principles, with instead academic texts providing 
'methodological signposts' to be applied to the analytic process (Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine 2008, pp. 98). However, throughout the process I sought support in the 
comments of my academic supervisors and fellow trainees using similar approaches, 
who also spoke of a sense of despair and feelings of complete incompetence at 
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points during their analysis. Eventually, through the support and knowledge of my 
supervisor, and the reading and rereading of research that has adopted a similar 
approach, I was able to produce an interpretation of the interviews. One that at this 
point in time feels sufficient. 
The process of doing 'discourse analysis' has been a challenging one.  However, it 
has highlighted to me the need for both personal and epistemological reflexivity 
throughout the analytic process. The process of reflexivity alerts us to how our 
observations and interpretations are influenced by us as observers, and by our 
relationship to what is being observed (Parker, 1999). Through the analysis of the 
interview accounts, my awareness has been drawn to the constructive nature of 
language and the influence this has upon the findings. Not only is this apparent in 
how the language used to guide the interviews may have influenced the responses 
of the interviewees, but also how reading and re-reading of existing discursive 
analytic research has influenced my interpretation of the data. Therefore, although it 
is crucial to familiarise oneself with existing literature, caution should be taken not to 
simply reproduce it. This may be avoided by constantly reflecting upon 
interpretations as well as ensuring these are evidenced by the extracts (Willig, 2008). 
4.3.3. The use of taken-for-granted language  
As a clinician in training, this research process has been extremely powerful in 
drawing attention to my need to be constantly aware of the evolution of language 
within mental health settings. This was initially made acutely obvious to me whilst 
asking questions during the interviews. Although primarily influenced by my research 
interests, and myself being dominant over the direction and structure of the 
conversations the interviews were physically and discursively located within 
psychiatry making it difficult to avoid taken-for-granted psychiatric language when 
developing questions in the interviews, particularly when adopting a journalistic style.  
The preference for this use of language perhaps demonstrates the ease that 
psychiatric language creates in communication between two professionals, 
additionally, to not use such language may be considered as lacking in knowledge in 
the field, certainly I felt this way at times (Boyle, 2011). This perhaps reflected, not 
only my training and experiences within psychiatric institutions that privilege the use 
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of particular language, but also how these constraints on what can be said further 
produces certain kinds of knowledge (Soyland, 1994). The result was that many of 
the assumptions of such language were not fully explored in the interviews, 
compounded by the lexical relationships between many of the terms in psychiatry 
(Terre Blanche, 1995). This limited the available data for analysis and therefore 
required greater deconstruction within the analysis, again it was only possible 
through the support of my supervisor, who continually reminded me to, "Shine a 
light" and remain curious about the language used within the talk with the 
psychiatrists.   
As a clinician currently working with in a system that privileges discourses of 
individualisation, pathology, abnormality, and diagnosis, it was extremely difficult to 
notice, let alone unpick, the 'taken for granted' constructions in psychiatric language 
and discourse. This highlighted to me how ingrained these discursive repertoires are 
and how influential they have become upon thinking, including my own. Although, 
the process of doing such a piece of work has highlighted to me that dominant 
discourses can be extremely limiting, by sensitising me to the productive nature of 
language it has provided me with a greater understanding of the use of language in 
clinical practice, and that the there is great possibility for change and alternative 
understandings (Harper, 1996). 
4.4. Implications 
The findings of this study, along with the literature reviewed in the introduction to this 
research, indicate dominant biomedical and psychiatric discursive repertoires have 
maintained the status quo within mainstream mental health services, and in addition, 
have minimised challenges to dominant paradigms (Harper, 1999). I have included 
some implications that are consistent with the analysis for different interest groups in 
mental health including researchers, professionals and service users. These 
suggestions are consistent with the idea of using discourse analysis to promote 
'subversive discursive practices and spaces for resistance' (Willig, 1999, p12).   
 Although this study was concerned with complex social and psychological 
processes involving the negotiation of meaning and interpretations among the 
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participants, the findings are consistent with a number of other studies therefore 
there are modest grounds for generalisation (Willig 2002).  
4.4.1. Research and theory 
The discursive repertoires drawn upon during this study highlight the current 
dominance in mainstream psychiatry and psychology of the assumption that the 
focus of research and theory should be, 'decontextualised individuals, whose 
behaviours, cognitions and emotions are best accounted for by reference to their 
brains or minds' (Boyle, 2011, pp. 34; Dillon et al., 2012). It is possible a shift from 
this positivist empiricist research paradigm, which relies upon unrepresentative 
categories, may facilitate the availability of theoretical paradigms through which 
professionals can attempt to explicitly link the social and the 
behavioural/psychological (Harrop, et al., 1996). Such models could be achieved by 
researchers adopting ideas such as the 'lifelines' approach suggested by Rose 
(2001); which calls for aetiological theories that recognise how organisms and their 
environments are in constant interaction or interpenetration throughout life, rather 
than dualistic theories advocating artificial distinctions between biology, psychology 
and the social or contextual (Cromby et al., 2013).  
In recent years, trauma-informed models have begun to draw upon available 
research findings to provide a contextualised understanding psychosis related 
experiences such as, dissociation, and hallucinations (Dillon et al., 2012; Read et al., 
2005). In doing so, they provide accounts that adequately distinguish between how 
biology enables distress, whilst not simply reducing biology to primarily causal 
(Harre, 2002). Therefore, rather than treating biology as irrelevant, there should be 
research and theories which investigate how aspects of our biological systems are 
bound up with social and relational processes, rather than simply causal. By 
including in accounts biological features, such as neural mechanisms, whereby 
societal and relational influences can become part of individual subjectivity, there is 
greater potential for such research and resultant theories to challenge prevalent 
biomedical accounts (Cromby, 2003; Dillon et al., 2012). Inevitably this will involve 
complex theories which acknowledge the multiple origins and influences upon 
experiences of distress. However, this may ultimately provide professionals with 
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adequate discursive frameworks to acknowledge the heterogeneity of experiences 
with which they are faced. Furthermore, these paradigms could lead to theories that 
play a key role in countering biomedical formulations by making distress 
psychologically and socially intelligible (Boyle, 2011).  
4.4.2. Clinical implications  
This study has shed light on how the language available to professionals such as 
'trauma', 'symptoms', and that of diagnostic categories, play a powerful productive 
role in constructing and constituting the realities of distressed people (Georgaca, 
2013). Mental health professionals can play a key role in countering the prevalence 
of what Boyle (2011) calls context-free or context-lite language in mental health 
services. The apparent reliance upon language reified through diagnostic systems 
supports suggestions that professionals risk sounding unprofessional or strange for 
using 'non-professionals terms', and are uncomfortable or embarrassed to embark 
on detailed description of sometimes horrific abuses (Boyle, 2011, p. 41; Read et al., 
2006). Given the power of language in relegating the importance of context, it too 
can play an equally important role in making distress meaningful and intelligible 
(Boyle, 2011). The following section considers some suggestions for introducing 
context rich language into professional practice. 
4.4.2.1. Formulation 
 Johnstone (2013) advocates team formulation as a process of contextualising and 
making meaningful a person's distress. Formulation aims to draw upon a variety of 
psychological models and theories and attempts to integrate these through their 
personal meaning to the distressed person (DCP, 2011). However, as noted above, 
it is important to be mindful of theoretical orientations to formulation that risk simply 
replicating individualising pathological assumptions. In recent years there has been 
interest in formulation being performed at a team level (Summers, 2006). Such an 
approach may allow life experiences including experiences of physical or sexual 
abuse, to be a subject that is discussed openly in teams, and provide a framework to 
facilitate the translating of 'symptoms' and 'illnesses' into understandable responses 
to  life circumstances (Johnstone, 2013). Additionally it allows an equally important 
focus upon the more mundane experiences which lead to emotional and 
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psychological distress, such experiences might include racism, social isolation and 
bullying etc (Boyle, 2006). Johnstone (2013), as well as several other researchers, 
have highlighted the approaches effectiveness in promoting psychosocial 
understandings and moving away from diagnostic-based plans in a variety of setting 
including inpatient and community mental health teams (Pilgrim, 2002). 
Johnstone (2013) also advocates for team formulations to be 'trauma informed',  that 
is to say that if there is any known history of physical or sexual abuse, or neglect, 
then the persons presenting difficulties should be considered as possible effects  
(pp.232). In addition, if a formulation does not appear to account the difficulties and 
distress experienced by the individual, then trauma should be explored as a possible 
explanatory factor. It is important to note that this acknowledgement of trauma is not 
an indication that trauma focused therapy should be the immediate focus of support 
and intervention. However, such a formulation will provide an evolving framework 
through which support can be provided and also provide a shared understanding 
between the service user and mental health team (Dallos & Stedmon, 2006). In 
doing so, this would make it difficult not to begin to focus upon systems maintaining 
abuses and neglect, therefore encouraging preventative work such as programmes 
to enhance child safety (Davies & Burdett, 2004).  
4.4.2.2. Education and training of professionals 
As noted in this study, the disclosure of traumatic events to psychiatrists can affect 
the conceptualisation of distress and the access to treatment available to service 
users. A study in New Zealand found that of 191 women receiving counselling for 
childhood sexual abuse, found the average time taken for them to tell anyone of the 
abuse was 16 years (Read et al., 2006). This perhaps reflects the taken-for-granted 
biomedical paradigms used to understand severe mental health problems such as 
'psychosis' and 'schizophrenia'. Mental health workers should be supported to 
develop the skills to question and challenge these taken-for-granted paradigms 
which greatly influence practices, such as enquiring whether a person has 
experienced physical or sexual abuse. Educational institutions are ideally placed to 
provide information about alternatives to dominant paradigm of diagnosis, and the 
effects of individualising and pathologising human distress. Cromby, Harper, and 
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Reavey (2008) reported that the main available textbooks available in undergraduate 
courses are structured according to psychiatric diagnosis. Furthermore it is 
suggested that there is a strong influence of bio-determinism in psychiatry training 
courses (Kemker & Kvadi, 1995). This could be countered by a shift in a focus to 
theories that acknowledge links between power, powerlessness and mental health 
(Williams & Lindley, 1996). More specifically this may be facilitated by providing 
information about the social constructions of psychosis and the implications this has 
for those who receive such a diagnosis. This may contribute to providing an 
alternative discursive space to challenge the current dominant psychiatric notions 
which limit contextualised understanding of distress (Boyle, 2011). 
4.4.2.3. Clinical psychologists 
Clinical Psychology could play a key role in promoting the availability of alternative 
discourses. However, current mainstream psychological thinking is strongly informed 
by CBT approach which fail to challenge traditional assumptions of psychotic 
experiences, by locating pathology within the individual (NICE, 2010; Boyle, 2011). 
Clinical Psychologists should challenge these dominant approaches, by advocating 
theories and models that help those labelled as 'psychotic', who also may be 
survivors of trauma, to support a contextualised understanding of their distress 
(Johnstone, 2011). This may be achieved by offering social constructionist informed 
talking therapies, such as Narrative Therapy. These acknowledges the impact of the 
'normal' world upon people by broadening the scope of intervention from the 
'pathologised individual' to include political, socio-cultural, gender and ethnicity 
informed accounts of peoples distress which challenges the taken-for-granted 
biomedical paradigms (White, 2007). In focusing intervention at more distal levels, 
this may allow subversion of the association between psychosis and individual 
pathology, providing the potential for traumatic life experiences to be acknowledged 
by formulation and intervention that is rooted in a person's lived experience (Smail, 
2001). 
4.4.3. Users of mental health services 
Interviews were not conducted with users of service users in this study, therefore 
many of the suggestions here will be speculative. However, given research indicating 
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how biomedical models held by professionals plays a significant role in transforming 
a person's experiences and complaints to symptoms of mental disorders; the use of 
language within the culture of psychiatry and psychiatric services has very real 
implications for those who use them (Georgaca, 2013).   
Over many years the mental health service user movement has developed to 
become a progressive political force that provides alternative space outside 
predominantly biomedical psychiatric services (Tait & Lester, 2005).  The availability 
of access to groups such as the National Hearing Voices Network have long 
advocated for the acknowledgement in services of the high prevalence of childhood 
physical and sexual abuse in those receiving psychiatric diagnosis (Dillon et al., 
2012). In particular, these movements have voiced their belief that there is meaning 
in a person's experiences diagnosed as 'psychosis'. Such movements provide an 
important alternative discursive space that should be increasingly heard and 
engaged with by mental health professionals. Therefore, a greater emphasis should 
be placed on developing links with mental health services through joint training 
involving users, carers and mainstream mental health workers (Brunning et al., 
1994). Furthermore, academic training courses as well as professional development 
courses should give equal weighting to texts or literature produced by users, such as 
writing produced by The Hearing Voices Network, as well as publications such as 
Asylum magazine which is produced by users and professionals working together. 
Additionally, future research in the area of this trauma and psychosis could focus 
upon service users’ experiences of speaking about trauma in relation to receiving a 
diagnosis of psychosis. This may allow professionals to be influenced by ordinary 
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Appendix 1 - Literature Search Terms 
Search: EBSCO  
Psych info and psych articles. Searched psychiatrists AND attitudes AND psychosis, 
dates 1970 -2012. Returned 113 results. Refined by presence in title of attitudes and 
psychosis – included opinions and views in title. After refinement 19 articles 
































PARTICIPANT INFORMATION  
You are being invited to take part in a research study. In order to help you decide whether 
you would like to participate or not, please take time to read the following information 
carefully. 
What is the title of the study? 
How Psychiatrists talk about the relationship between psychological trauma and psychosis. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
There is little research that has looked at Psychiatrists attitudes and beliefs about the 
relationship between psychological trauma and psychosis. This study is interested in seeing 
whether the views held by psychiatric professionals about trauma and the aetiology of 
psychosis influence views about diagnosis, treatment and other aspects of care provided. 
The study is being conducted as part of the researcher’s Doctoral Degree in Clinical 
Psychology at the University of East London. 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been approached to take part in the study, as you are a Psychiatrist who routinely 
works in the NHS. We are interested in hearing about the views and experiences of 
psychiatric professionals who are likely to have had direct contact with people experiencing 
psychosis. 
Do I have to take part? 
Participation in the study is entirely voluntary. It is your decision whether or not you take part. 
If you do agree to take part, you will be free to withdraw any time, and you will not be asked 
to give any reason. 
What will happen if I choose to take part? 
You will be asked to sign a consent form stating that you are happy to take part in the study. 
Following this, you will be invited to attend a one-to-one, confidential interview at a time and 
place convenient for yourself. The researcher will ask questions about your views on the 
relationship between psychological trauma and psychosis. The interview will last no longer 
than 30-60 minutes and will be recorded and transcribed by the researcher. You will be 
given the opportunity to ask questions before and after the interview. 
What if I become distressed during the meeting? 
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Although unlikely, it is possible that the subject area being discussed may be upsetting for 
you. You are free to leave the study at any time. You are also free to take a break from the 
interview and return when you feel able to. The investigator can also give you contact details 
for further support.  
What will happen to my confidential information if I decide to take part? 
The researcher will ask you to provide some basic information about yourself at the interview 
such as gender, age and length of time qualified. Participants’ anonymity will be assured by 
assigning each participant a code. The codes and consent forms will be kept in a locked 
cabinet separate to the recordings of the interviews, transcribed materials and basic details 
about participants (e.g. name, age etc.). The researcher will transcribe all of the interviews. 
All of the identifiable information obtained in the interview will be anonymised.  Only the 
researcher, supervisors and examiners will have access to the transcribed material. Data will 
be only accessed via a password on a computer, and will be erased after five years. After 
examination of the research has been concluded, all digital records will be erased.  
What you say in the interview will be kept confidential. Small extracts of what you say may 
be used as quotes in the final write-up of the project though these will be anonymised. The 
researcher will only break confidentiality in the unlikely event that they have serious 
concerns about your safety or the safety of others. The researcher will try and talk to you 
about breaking confidentiality before they do so if possible. 
What are the risks and benefits of me taking part in the study? 
As discussed above, it is possible, though unlikely that the issues talked about in the 
interview may be emotional for you, and it is possible that you will think about or even re-
experience difficult events that have happened to you in the past.  
In terms of potential benefits, the findings of this research might help to change future 
experiences psychiatric services users or others involved in mental health services. 
Where will the interview take place? 
The interview will take place at convenient location for the interviewee.  
What if I change my mind and do not want to be involved in the project at a later date? 
You are not obliged to take part in this study, and are free to withdraw at any time. Should 
you choose to withdraw from the study you may do so without disadvantage to yourself and 
you do not have to give a reason for doing so. 
Ethical Approval 
This research project received Ethical Approval from the University of East London.  
Disclaimer   
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, up to the point when the data is 
included in the overall analysis. Should you choose to withdraw from the study you may do 
so without disadvantage to yourself and without any obligation to give a reason. Should you 
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withdraw, the researcher reserves the right to use your anonymised data in the write-up of 
the study and any further analysis that may be conducted by the researcher. 
Contact for further information 
Thank you for taking the time to read this leaflet. If you would like to take part or have any 
questions please contact Edward O’Donnell on the email below. Alternatively, you can 
telephone the researcher on one of the telephone numbers below.  
Researcher’s details: 
 
Name:   Edward O’Donnell, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Contact address: Doctoral Degree in Clinical Psychology  
School of Psychology 
University of East London  
Stratford Campus, University House 
Romford Road 
Stratford E15 4LZ 
Telephone: XXXXXXXXXXX 
Mobile: XXXXXXXXXXX 
E-mail:  XXXXXXXXXXX  
What if I have a query/complaint about the way the study is being conducted? 
University Research Ethics Committee 
If you have any queries or complaints regarding the conduct of the programme in which you 
are being asked to participate, please contact the Secretary of the University Research 
Ethics Committee, Ms Debbie Dada, Admissions and Ethics Officer, Graduate School, 
University of East London, Docklands Campus, London E16 2RD (Tel 020 8223 2976, 
Email: d.dada@uel.ac.uk) 









Project supervised by: 
 
Dr David Harper  
Professional Doctorate in 
Clinical Psychology 
School of Psychology  




























Appendix 4 - Consent Form 
Title of study:  




Gender:  F M  
Age: 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65> 
 
Stage of training: …………………………………………………………………………………
 …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
      
Please initial box 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet relating to 
this study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 

2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason for doing so. 

3 I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data from this 
research, will remain strictly confidential. Only the researchers involved in 
the study will have access to the data. I understand that anonymous 
extracts or quotes of what I say during the interview may be written up or 
published. 

4 I agree to take part in the above study.    
 

Name of participant:  Name of researcher: 
Signature:  Signature: 
Date:  Date: 
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Appendix 5 - Interview Prompts 
Please note that these questions only acted as a reminders to areas to be 
covered.  
Prior to the interview 
Following introductions, the researcher will outline what the interviewee may expect 
in terms of timing, structure and style of interview. Emphasis conversational style / 
hearing their point of view and expert understanding of the area. 
Request read and sign the consent form. 
Interview prompts. 
Only use as a guide - use probes to explore areas further. (Define trauma as 
experiences of physical or sexual abuse, or neglect). 
Definitional questions:  
a) How would you describe/define psychosis? 
 How would you describe psychosis to a patient? 
b) How would you describe/define trauma? 
c) What are your views on the aetiology/causes of psychosis? 
 Most important factors? 
 What causal models to do find most useful to draw upon in practice? 
 What do you consider when making a diagnosis? 
 are there causal factors that you feel influence a person 
prognosis/recovery/outcome? 
d) What role do you think trauma plays in psychosis (aetiology of)? 
 In comparison to other diagnosed e.g. PTSD/Depression? 
 What influence has research linking trauma and psychosis had upon mental 
health services/your practice 
 Is this something you ask about in practice? Routinely ask about? 
 Are things you look for that would make you ask? 
 Barriers to asking? 
e) Treatment 
 Would disclosure influence treatment options? 
 Would disclosure influence diagnosis? 






 What made you think of that? 
 Could you say a little more about that? 
 What influenced that decision?  
 Have you always held that view? 
After the interview. 
Enquire whether interviewee would like to add anything, perhaps an area they feel is 
important but not covered. 




















Appendix 6 - Transcriptions convention 
The transcription conventions used in this study were based on a simplified version 
Potter and Wetherell's (1987). These were chosen given the emphasis on the 
readability of the content as opposed to the detailed reproduction of speech feature, 
such as intonation or length of pauses.  
Notation Description 




Pauses considered noticeable were indicated by the use of a full 




Brief interruptions or encouragements were denoted by forward 




An underscore was used to denote an absence of any noticeable 
audible gap between to utterances, e.g. when one speaker is 




Chevrons were used to indicate points were material was omitted 
from the text due to being inaudible or there was significant 
doubts about its accuracy.  
 
[ ] Square brackets were used to provide descriptive information. 
 
Number e.g. 0, 1 Each transcript was formatted with wide margins and to include 




Extracts were numbered in the order they appear in the analysis section. 
Participants were given pseudonyms which were used to identify extracts in the 
analysis.  
















T 2 (154) 
 
T4 (123) - 
dualism 
T6  (156) 
Continuum: Ordered vs Disordered: Used in reference to 
personality disorder - Construction of normal and the abnormal 
the realm of psychiatry, psychosis being on the outer extreme of 
abnormality and therefore in need to intervention 
All humans slide on the scale - severe stress in the vulnerable 








Biological vs psychological mindedness: over biologically minded 
psychiatrists over diagnose bipolar and psychosis. What is this 
about, if more biological you believe more in the existence of 
these?? 
However: over psychological minded psychiatrists fail to use 
adequate medical intervention 
What is being 
constructed here? 







T 3 (286) 
T4 (584) 
Real versus not real psychotic 'symptoms'/illness: Idea that some 
behaviours and descriptions look like psychosis but are not 'real' 
psychosis - they are in fact 'symptoms' of other diagnosis - 
Example is PTSD 
Psuedo vs real hallucinations:  
Validity of category 
The construct of 








Symptoms in context of history: The linking of 'symptoms' to 
history changes the 'disorder' that the symptoms represents - 
therefore if person able to articulate make link/ or if symptoms 
phenomenologically linked to past trauma then PTSD 








Trauma:  is being associated with more 'psychological' diagnosis 
such as PTSD or BPD - not the more traditionally disease related 
diagnosis. Not in the domain of psychiatry? 
-Not just act of abuse/event but the emotional sequelae that 
follow 
Review transcript 
7 - remember 
similar discourse. 




Psychology not the realm of psychiatry: Acknowledging trauma 
and impact of life events can be positioned as over psychologising 











Lack of framework to integrate: Restricted by the idea that 
trauma/ life experience is very abstract whereas medicine works 
with the concrete the observable  






Appendix 8 - Extract from Reflexive Diary 
Following each of the interviews, I wrote some brief reflections. They were mainly 
made in brief note form. I referred back to these notes during the analysis process 
and during the write up of the study.  
Examples: 
Following interview with Dr C: 
Very hard interview. Extremely difficult to illicit any answers, perhaps reflects 
participants early stage of training. Responses seem very text book, he didn't appear 
to really draw upon his experiences that much - may have been due to wanting to 
come across as professional? Interesting that he closely adhered to diagnostic 
criteria, is this considered most professional way to communicate, maybe a language 
we both shared. Worth thinking about influence of proximity of training upon 
language/repertoires drawn upon. 
Interesting influence of past supervisor, she appears to have at least provided some 
sense that there is some clinical judgement. Became much easier to talk to when he 
was speaking about how past supervisor re-diagnosed in the context of past 
trauma's. His past supervisor sounds like would be a great participant - re-send 
information sheet and remind to follow up.  
Following interview with Dr D: 
Extremely interesting interview. Interview flowed very easily and didn't really require 
me to do much prompting. Interesting to hear how views changed overtime with 
experience. key that she had been so greatly influenced by systemic training which 
she feels influenced her formulations - still seemed to find it difficult to step outside 
diagnosis - professional alignment? Interesting how she likened speaking about 
content to heresy when first became psychiatrist - have times changed? 
Found myself agreeing with a lot that she said, may have stopped me exploring 
exactly why she had reached these views. Perhaps prevented me as questioning as 
should've been. Great that she was so complementary about the area of research. 
Interesting that she raised how psychologists risk just replicating mainstream ideas 
by adopting CBT model - definitely reflected her systemic training. Interesting 
comments she made off tape. Worth thinking about for next interview regarding 
being trained to listen, 'really listen' to what is being said by people when distressed. 
Does this reflect symptom watching/spotting? 
Point to consider for future interview - how much do they think about aetiology/how 
important do they think it is? Is it something they always think about? I'm not sure it 
is. Given a diagnosis and rationalising treatment isn't the same thing is it? 
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Appendix 9 - Example of Transcript 
 
 
